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ABOUT THIS REPORT
Since the late 1990s, issues surrounding race and employment have been a central research
focus at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee Center for Economic Development
(UWMCED). In a series of reports, the Center has analyzed racial disparities in employment in
the Milwaukee region, and the Center has been instrumental in calling public attention to
Milwaukee’s continuing lag, compared to other Northeast-Midwest metropolises, in generating
employment growth in the African American community. This study, focusing on the crisis of
joblessness among working-age black males, is the Center’s most exhaustive study yet on
Milwaukee’s central economic development challenge: closing the racial gap in employment that
plagues this region.
The author of this report is Dr. Marc V. Levine, Professor of History and Urban Studies,
and Director of the UWMCED. Lauren McHargue, a policy analyst at the Center, provided
important research and production assistance.
UWMCED is a unit of the College of Letters and Science at the University of WisconsinMilwaukee. The College established UWMCED in 1990, to provide university research and
technical assistance to community organizations and units of government working to improve the
Greater Milwaukee economy. The analysis and conclusions presented in this report are solely
those of UWMCED and do not necessarily reflect the views and opinions of UW-Milwaukee, or
any of the organizations providing financial support to the Center.
The UWMCED strongly believes that informed public debate is vital to the development of
good public policy. The Center publishes briefing papers, detailed analyses of economic trends
and policies, and “technical assistance” reports on issues of applied economic development. In
these ways, as well as in conferences and public lectures sponsored by the Center, we hope to
contribute to public discussion on economic development policy in Southeastern Wisconsin.
Further information about the Center and its reports and activities is available at our web
site: www.ced.uwm.edu
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Executive Summary
There is no greater economic challenge facing Milwaukee than the crisis of joblessness
among black males in the city. This study presents the most up-to-date analysis available of
recent trends, examining racial disparities in the city and regional labor markets, and placing
Milwaukee’s record in comparative and historical context. Our chief finding is that Milwaukee’s
30-year trend of near-linear growth in black male joblessness peaked in the city in 2003 at 51.3
percent and declined to 44.1 percent by 2005. In addition, by 2005, racial disparities narrowed
somewhat in the city and region, and Milwaukee’s black-white employment gap moved closer to
the average of other Northeast-Midwest cities and metropolitan areas. Nevertheless, the black
male jobless rate remains unacceptably high in Milwaukee, with black male joblessness here
ranking second highest among comparable Northeast-Midwest metropolitan areas in 2005. Civic
leadership in Milwaukee, we contend, continues to lack the vision, policies, and institutions to
comprehensively attack and meaningfully alleviate the crisis of race and jobs in the city and
region.
This report contains three main sections. First, we present the most current data on trends in
black male joblessness and racial disparities in employment, for Milwaukee as well as a pool of
“benchmark” cities and regions. Second, we analyze how the confluence of three key factors –
suburbanization, hyper-segregation, and deindustrialization-- has shaped the particularly sharp
racial disparities in the Milwaukee labor market. Finally, we examine the shortcomings of
existing policies and strategies and identify some promising alternative policy options.
Our key findings:

I. Race and Male Joblessness in Milwaukee: 2005
The jobless rate for working-age black males (ages 16-64) in metropolitan Milwaukee region
stood at 43.1 percent in 2005, a small decline from 46.5 percent in 2002. White male joblessness
increased slightly between 2002-2005 in metro Milwaukee and thus, combined with the decline
in black male joblessness during this period, the region’s racial gap in joblessness shrank by
almost five percentage points.
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A huge racial gap in male joblessness exists in all age categories in metro Milwaukee, from
teenage workers to prime working-age adults. Black male joblessness not only exceeds the white
rate by at least 20 percentage points in all age groupings, but the jobless rate among black males
also is significantly higher than for Hispanic males in metro Milwaukee, particularly among
younger workers.

Table 1
Male Joblessness in Metropolitan Milwaukee, 2002-2005
(percentage of working-age males unemployed or not in the labor force)
YEAR
2002
2005

BLACK
46.5%
43.1%

WHITE
18.7%
20.1%

HISPANIC
25.6%
29.3%

There is a sharp regional/racial polarization of Milwaukee’s male labor market, with the
largest gaps in jobless rates separating white suburbanites from black residents of the central
city. For example, among prime working-age males (ages 25-54), the jobless rate for white
suburbanites in 2005 was 11.8 percent, compared to 34.6 percent black males living in the city of
Milwaukee.

II. Race and Joblessness in Milwaukee: A Comparative Perspective,
2002-2005
Despite modest improvements between 2002-2005, the rate of black male joblessness in the
Milwaukee region remains near the highest of Northeast-Midwest metropolitan areas, and in
2005 the racial gap in male joblessness was, with the exception of metro Pittsburgh, the widest
among “Frostbelt” metropolitan areas.
In 2002, Milwaukee registered the highest working-age black male jobless rate among the 15
“Frostbelt” metropolitan areas against which we benchmarked Milwaukee’s performance among
these regions; in 2005, Milwaukee recorded the second highest black male jobless rate. The gap
in Milwaukee separating white and black rates of male joblessness, which was 27.8 percentage
points in 2002, the highest in the Frostbelt in 2002, declined to 23.0 points in 2005, which
nevertheless placed Milwaukee second worst among our benchmark regions.
7
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Milwaukee’s ranking on these indicators is somewhat better when comparisons are at the city
level, but city-to-city comparisons are somewhat misleading, because in metro Milwaukee,
unlike elsewhere in the Frostbelt, there has been virtually no suburbanization of the working-age
black male population.
Table 2:
Black Male Jobless Rates in Selected Metropolitan Areas: 2002-2005
Percentage of working-age (16-64) black males either
unemployed or out of the labor force
2002
Baltimore
Minneapolis
Cincinnati
Indianapolis
Pittsburgh
Cleveland
Boston
Detroit
Kansas City
Philadelphia
Chicago
St. Louis
Buffalo
Milwaukee
Average

2005
N/A
N/A
N/A
30.8%
31.9%
32.3%
36.4%
39.0%
39.1%
39.7%
41.1%
42.8%
45.7%
46.5%
38.7%

Boston
Baltimore
Indianapolis
Kansas City
Minneapolis
Cincinnati
Philadelphia
St. Louis
Buffalo
Chicago
Detroit
Cleveland
Milwaukee
Pittsburgh
Average

28.3%
31.6%
34.4%
34.9%
35.9%
36.3%
39.7%
40.1%
40.4%
42.1%
42.7%
42.7%
43.1%
48.3%
39.1%

III. Black Male Joblessness in Milwaukee, 1970-2005: Historical
Development and Explanatory Factors
The rise in joblessness among working-age black males in Milwaukee during the past 35
years has been relentless, increasing substantially at each census measurement until reaching a
staggering 51.5 percent in 2003 (before improving to 44.1 percent by 2005).
Perhaps even more striking has been the growth in joblessness among prime working-age
black males in Milwaukee since 1970. Joblessness among males between the ages of 25-54 is
particularly revealing of the state of the local labor market; we’re much less likely to see, in this
age group, potential workers voluntarily absent from the labor market because of schooling,
retirement, or homemaking.
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The jobless rate for prime working-age black males was 15.2 percent in 1970, relatively
modest by historical standards, albeit double the rate for white city residents and almost
quadruple the rate for white suburbanites. However, as has been the case for all working-age
black males, joblessness among prime-working age black males has grown ceaselessly in
Milwaukee since 1970, peaking at an astonishing 40.8 percent in 2003, before improving to 34.6
percent by 2005.
Three key factors underlie the crisis of black male joblessness in Milwaukee:
•

Deindustrialization: Manufacturing was a critical source of jobs for Milwaukee’s
black males through the 1970s, and, to a greater degree than almost anywhere else in
the Frostbelt, industrial decline fundamentally diminished black male employment
opportunities in the city;

•

Suburbanization of Jobs: Since 1980, all of the net job growth in metro Milwaukee
has been in the suburbs, with the largest increases in the exurban counties (up 81
percent). The city of Milwaukee has lost almost 18 percent of its job base since 1980.

•

Racial Segregation: The suburbanization of jobs in metropolitan Milwaukee,
especially in manufacturing, has combined with the region’s entrenched residential
segregation to produce a “spatial mismatch” in the regional labor market. This
mismatch has severely limited employment possibilities for the region’s black males.
The overwhelming majority (92%) of the region’s working-age black males live in a
city with an eroding employment base, while all of the net job growth in the region is
occurring in exurban areas where few blacks live and to which city-based minority
workers have minimal transportation access. Through 2000, just over 8,500 black
workers in metropolitan Milwaukee –only 11 percent of all black workers in the
region—had secured employment in the exurban counties, representing a tiny fraction
of the exurban workforce. By contrast, 43.1 percent of the region’s white workers
were employed in the exurban counties in 2000.

Two other factors –disparities in educational attainment as well as the age structure of
Milwaukee’s black male community-- also help explain both racial differences in male
joblessness in Milwaukee, as well as why the employment picture for black males is especially
dismal here compared to other cities and regions.
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There is a substantial racial gap in male educational attainment in Milwaukee; in the
metropolitan area, for example, white males are almost three times as likely as black males to
hold college, professional, or advanced degrees, a disparity that mirrors the racial disparity in
male joblessness.
Milwaukee’s working-age black male population is, on average, younger and less educated
than counterparts elsewhere in the Frostbelt; since joblessness rates are higher among the young
and less educated, this demographic factor also helps explain Milwaukee’s high rate of black
male joblessness.

IV. Local Policy and the Crisis of Black Male Joblessness in
Milwaukee
Milwaukee Mayor Tom Barrett and the region’s corporate leadership in the GMC and
MMAC appear to have settled into a three-pronged “jobs strategy” to combat predominantly
minority inner city joblessness: workforce development, minority entrepreneurship, and
regionalism. All are worthy policy objectives and, in principle, can contribute to improving the
local labor market. All, however, are deeply flawed as cornerstones of a local jobs strategy; in
particular, without other more direct job creation policies (“demand-side”), these (‘supply side”)
approaches are unlikely to have a significant impact on the crisis of black male joblessness in
Milwaukee.
•

Milwaukee’s recent history, as is the case nationwide, is littered with disappointing
results from job training programs. Workforce development is predicated on the
fallacious assumptions that enough jobs exist for properly trained workers, or that
with adequate training enough private-sector jobs will materialize for all workers. In
fact, in 2005, by conservative estimate, there were 88,294 more jobless than
available jobs in metro Milwaukee; there were six jobless Milwaukeeans for every
available job in 2005; there were an astounding nine jobless for every available fulltime job. The primary need in Milwaukee is not improved job training, but rather
policies that increase the demand for low- to moderate-skilled labor and attack the
critical shortage of available jobs in the region.

•

Minority entrepreneurship offers little prospect of improving the employment picture
for working-age black males. In the 50 largest metro areas in the country, there is no
10

UWM Center for Economic Development

evidence that high rates of black business ownership produce low rates of black
joblessness. Black-owned businesses employ a tiny fraction of workers (less than
one percent in Milwaukee), so even huge growth in black-owned businesses would
have a trivial impact on the black jobless rate.
•

M-7 “regionalism” could contribute significantly to alleviating the crisis of black
male joblessness. But, so far, the M-7 seems focused on branding and marketing
Milwaukee and pursuing what one researcher has dubbed the “job training charade,”
rather than the kinds of meaningful regional “equity” polices in transportation,
public finance and housing that could make a difference in combating minority
joblessness.

V. Policy Options: New Directions to Combat Black Male Joblessness
in Milwaukee
This study has identified three strategies that offer far greater likelihood of reducing black
male joblessness in Milwaukee than current approaches:
•

Public infrastructure investment, which will not only meet pressing needs in a
community with aging infrastructure, but could also play a critical role in boosting,
Keynesian-style, local demand for low- to moderate-skilled labor. Particularly if
accompanied by explicit minority-hiring goals or low-income resident preferential
hiring programs, public investments could be a central element in a real Milwaukee
“jobs strategy.” The examples of the Marquette Interchange project and the city of
Milwaukee’s “Residents Preference Program” (RPP) show the promise of this
“demand-side” approach to the labor market.
In particular, this study recommends that Milwaukee leaders vigorously pursue
development of a jobs-producing, competitiveness-enhancing regional light rail
transit system. In its political resistance to light rail, Milwaukee is increasingly
isolated among U.S. cities; and, the more Milwaukee remains immobilized on this
issue, the more the region risks falling further behind our competitors economically,
and the more we lose the opportunity for a “big bang” investment that could
ameliorate the labor market for low- to moderate-skilled workers.
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•

The RPP and Marquette Interchange projects show that targeted hiring standards
attached to local investments can improve the employment prospects for minorities
and the disadvantaged. Milwaukee should follow the example of a growing number
of cities around the country and attach “community benefits agreements” (CBAs) to
major redevelopment projects, to give preferential hiring to inner city residents and
minorities, and to require developers receiving public subsidies to meet job creation
and wage standards. Moreover, all developers doing business in Milwaukee should
be encouraged to meet these standards.

•

A critical element of a jobs strategy in Milwaukee must involve opening up the
suburban labor markets of the region to racial diversity. “Opening up the suburbs”
might include several policy options, but the two most important are transportation
and housing. Regional transportation policies must be realigned to facilitate the
access of central city workers to suburban employment centers; and building
affordable housing in the suburbs is essential, so that low- to –moderate-skilled
workers, with limited incomes, can live in greater proximity to the location of 90
percent of the region’s entry-level job openings.
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I. Introduction
There is no greater economic challenge facing Milwaukee than the crisis of joblessness
among black males in the city. Indeed, as we have documented in earlier reports, black males
have increasingly faced a “stealth depression” in Milwaukee, with jobless rates exceeding 50
percent by the early 2000s. 1 In the past year, several studies have brought attention nationally to
the crisis of “black males left behind” 2 in cities across the country, noting in particular the
growing “disconnect” between young black males and the worlds of school and work. 3
But while the problem of black male joblessness is national in scope and pervasive in urban
America, the crisis is especially acute in Milwaukee. By the early 1990s, Milwaukee had already
begun to register the highest rates of black male joblessness among all comparable-sized cities
and metropolitan areas in the Northeast-Midwest “industrial belt,” 4 a trend that continued
through the early 2000s. Moreover, over the past two decades, the gap separating employment
rates among white and black working age males in Milwaukee has consistently been the widest
among these “Rustbelt” cities and regions.
This report presents the most up-to-date analysis available of recent trends in black male
joblessness in Milwaukee, examining racial disparities in the city and regional labor markets, and
placing Milwaukee’s record in comparative and historical context. Our chief finding is that
Milwaukee’s 30-year trend of near-linear growth in black male joblessness peaked in the city in
2003 at 51.3 percent and declined by 2005 to 44.1 percent. In addition, by 2005, racial disparities
had narrowed somewhat in the city and region, and Milwaukee’s black-white employment gap
had moved closer to the average of other Northeast-Midwest cities and metropolitan areas.
Nevertheless, the black male jobless rate remains unacceptably high in Milwaukee, with black
male joblessness here ranking second highest among comparable Northeast-Midwest
metropolitan areas in 2005. Civic leadership in Milwaukee, we contend, continues to lack the
vision, policies, and institutions to comprehensively attack and meaningfully alleviate the crisis
of race and jobs in the city and region.
This report contains three main sections. First, we present the most current data on trends in
black male joblessness and racial disparities in employment, for Milwaukee as well as a pool of
“benchmark” cities and regions. Second, we analyze how the confluence of three key factors –
14

UWM Center for Economic Development

suburbanization, hyper-segregation, and deindustrialization-- has shaped the particularly sharp
racial disparities in the Milwaukee labor market. Finally, we examine the shortcomings of
existing policies and strategies and identify some promising alternative policy options. Some
observers have recently called for nothing less than a Milwaukee “Marshall Plan” to attack the
city’s job crisis; 5 in the conclusion of this report we sketch the broad outlines of what such a
“Marshall Plan” might look like.

II. Measuring Joblessness
The level of joblessness in a labor market is most often conveyed in one universally
recognized and widely reported number: the unemployment rate. This statistic measures the
percentage of people over the age of 16 in an area’s civilian labor force, actively looking for
work, who do not have a job.
However, the official unemployment rate is an imperfect and sometimes misleading indicator
of the true extent of joblessness. As calculated by the federal Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS),
the officially unemployed do not include working-age people who are not working but, for
various reasons, are not in the labor force. Some of these potential workers, such as most
students and homemakers, as well as the voluntarily self-employed or voluntarily retired, have
chosen not to be in the labor force; thus, it makes sense to exclude them from measures of
unemployment.
However, many other potential workers are not included in the official unemployment rate
even though they are not necessarily among the voluntarily jobless. Some are “discouraged
workers,” who have given up looking for elusive employment. Others may simply not enter the
labor market, convinced that appropriate jobs are not available. These individuals do not show up
in the official unemployment statistics, although they are clearly part of the jobless population in
a community.
Thus, because the official unemployment rate ignores those who are not seeking jobs, it
understates the full scope of joblessness. A different way, therefore, to gauge joblessness –and
the one we will use in this report—is to look at the percentage of the total working age not
employed: everyone between the ages of 16-64, not just those actively in the civilian labor force.
Obviously, this “jobless rate” will never be zero: aside from “frictional unemployment” (people
between jobs), there are always working-age full-time students, homemakers, early retirees, or
15
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the self-employed who are voluntarily not in the labor force. 6 But clearly, the more robust the
labor market, the lower the jobless rate for the entire working-age population. Finally, to
eliminate the effects of gender differences in labor market participation over time –as well as to
focus on the particular crisis of black male joblessness—this study reports on trends, by race, in
the rate of male joblessness in Milwaukee and other cities and regions. 7

III. Race and Male Joblessness in Milwaukee: 2005
The most recent data on race and employment in cities and metropolitan areas comes from
the American Community Survey (ACS), a relatively new annual nationwide survey, conducted
by the U.S. Bureau of the Census since 2001. Care must be taken in using this data to analyze
urban trends (see the Appendix to this report); among other issues, the ACS samples, when
broken down by race and ethnicity, are small enough to contain a rather substantial margin of
error. Although this error margin is not larger than the “statistical range” contained in the local
“race and unemployment” data historically provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, it does
mean that we should be cautious in interpreting changes from one year to the next or differences
between cities or metro areas, all of which might merely reflect measurement “noise.” Context
and longer time series are important in sorting out genuine trends as opposed to measurement
variation. Notwithstanding these important caveats, the ACS nevertheless offers us the most upto-date statistics on race and employment in U.S. cities and metropolitan areas (as well as a host
of other social, demographic, economic, and housing characteristics).
As Table 1 reveals, the jobless rate for working-age black males in the four-county
metropolitan Milwaukee region 8 stood at 43.1 percent in 2005, a small decline from 46.5 percent
in 2002 (the first year for which data is available for most cities and metropolitan areas in the
ACS). 9 White male joblessness increased slightly between 2002-2005 in metro Milwaukee and
thus, combined with the decline in black male joblessness during this period, the region’s racial
gap in joblessness shrank by almost five percentage points. Nevertheless, the region’s racial
disparity in joblessness remains imposing: in 2005, the jobless rate for black males was more
than double the white rate and, as we shall see, Milwaukee’s racial gap in joblessness remains
among the widest in large Northeast-Midwest metropolitan areas.
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Table 1:
Male Joblessness in Metropolitan Milwaukee, 2002-2005
(percentage of working-age* males unemployed or not in the labor force)
YEAR
2002

BLACK
46.5%

WHITE
18.7%

HISPANIC
25.6%

2005

43.1%

20.1%

29.3%

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, American Community Survey, 2002, 2005
*Working-age = between ages of 16-64

Tables 2 and 3 provide more detail on male joblessness in metro Milwaukee in 2005,
breaking down jobless rates by race, age, and place of residence. Three observations stand out.
First, jobless rates are high in all age categories for black males in metro Milwaukee. Even in the
prime working-age category --between the ages of 25 and 54 when retirement or schooling are
not significant factors removing potential workers from the labor market-- one-third of
Milwaukee’s black males are either unemployed or not in the labor market. In all other workingage categories, the black male jobless rate was near 50 percent (and a staggering 76.3 percent for
black male teenagers).
Table 2:
Metropolitan Milwaukee Male Jobless Rates: 2005
By Race, Ethnicity, and Age
AGE
CATEGORY
16-19
20-24
25-54
55-64
All Working-Age

BLACK

WHITE

HISPANIC

76.3%
48.2%
33.4%
49.1%
43.1%

52.6%
21.1%
13.4%
29.6%
20.1%

48.5%
33.0%
24.5%
44.0%
29.3%

Source: Same as Table 1
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Table 3:
City-Suburb Disparities in Male Jobless Rates in Metropolitan Milwaukee: 2005
By Race, Ethnicity, Age, and Place of Residence
AGE
16-19
20-24
25-54
55-64
All
16-64

BLACK
CITY
76.6%
50.4%
34.6%
51.9%
44.1%

BLACK
SUBURBS
52.4%
33.2%
28.3%
22.2%
28.6%

WHITE
CITY
53.8%
32.8%
18.7%
43.3%
25.5%

WHITE
HISPANIC HISPANIC
SUBURBS
CITY
SUBURBS
52.4%
54.9%
36.0%
17.4%
34.7%
33.0%
11.8%
21.1%
27.9%
26.3%
46.8%
40.1%
18.3%
27.6%
25.3%

Source: Same as Table 1

Second, a huge racial gap in male joblessness exists in all age categories in metro
Milwaukee, from teenage workers to prime working-age adults. Black male joblessness not only
exceeds the white rate by at least 20 percentage points in all age groupings, but the jobless rate
among black males also is significantly higher than for Hispanic males in metro Milwaukee,
particularly among younger workers.

Table 4:
Racial Segmentation in the Metropolitan Milwaukee Labor Market
The Percentage of Region’s Working-Age Males, By Age Category,
Living In the City of Milwaukee: 2005
AGE
CATEGORY
16-19
20-24
25-54
55-64
All WorkingAge

BLACK

WHITE

HISPANIC

98.7%
95.6%
89.6%
93.4%
92.0%

15.4%
25.3%
23.0%
23.0%
21.9%

66.2%
67.0%
69.2%
57.6%
67.8%

Source: Same as Table 1

Finally, as Table 3 shows, for both black and white males in metro Milwaukee, there is a
substantial disparity between the jobless rates in the city of Milwaukee as opposed to the
suburbs. Among prime working-age white males, for example, the jobless rate in the city is
almost 60 percent higher than it is in the suburbs. However, since the vast majority (78 percent)
18
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of working-age white males in the region live in the suburbs, the impact of this city-suburban
disparity on overall rates of metropolitan area white male joblessness is mitigated. On the other
hand, this city-suburban disparity overlaps with the racial segregation of metro Milwaukee’s
labor market: over 90 percent of the region’s black male workers live in the city of Milwaukee
(Table 4) where, as we will examine later, there has been no net job growth since the late 1970s.
Consequently, as Table 3 clearly shows, today there is a sharp racial polarization of the region’s
male labor market, with the largest gaps in jobless rates separating white suburbanites from black
residents of the central city. For example, among prime working-age males (25-54), the jobless
rate for white suburbanites in 2005 was 11.8 percent, compared to 34.6 percent black males
living in the city of Milwaukee. We shall return in detail later in this study to the devastating
consequences of suburbanization and segregation in shaping the crisis of joblessness among
Milwaukee’s working-age black males.

IV. Race and Joblessness in Milwaukee: A Comparative Perspective,
2002-2005
The crisis of black male joblessness pervades urban America. But, as the following tables
make clear, the employment situation for black males in Milwaukee, despite modest
improvements between 2002-2005, remains near the bleakest among the largest cities and
metropolitan areas in the Northeast and Midwest. We have compared race and male joblessness
in Milwaukee to other “benchmark” cities and regions along the following dimensions:
joblessness for all working-age black males (ages 16-64); joblessness for prime working-age
black males (ages 25-54); and the disparity in jobless rates between black and white males.
As Tables 5-8 illustrate, the rate of black male joblessness in the Milwaukee region remains
near the highest of Northeast-Midwest metropolitan areas, and in 2005 the racial gap in male
joblessness was, with the exception of metro Pittsburgh, the widest among “Frostbelt”
metropolitan areas. On all our indicators of black male joblessness or racial disparity, metro

19

UWM Center for Economic Development

Milwaukee’s rate –in both 2002 and 2005—was substantially above the Frostbelt average. On
the other hand, between 2002-2005 about half of the Frostbelt metropolitan areas, including
Milwaukee, experienced declines in the black male jobless rate and shrinking racial disparities
(Tables 5 and 7). However, although any decline in metro Milwaukee’s rate of black male
joblessness is encouraging, the black employment gains since 2002 have been quite modest and
metro Milwaukee’s black male jobless rate remains high by comparative and historical
standards. 10

Table 5:
Black Male Jobless Rates in Selected Metropolitan Areas: 2002-2005
Percentage of working-age (16-64) black males either
unemployed or out of the labor force
2002
Baltimore
Minneapolis
Cincinnati
Indianapolis
Pittsburgh
Cleveland
Boston
Detroit
Kansas City
Philadelphia
Chicago
St. Louis
Buffalo
Milwaukee
Average

2005
N/A
N/A
N/A
30.8%
31.9%
32.3%
36.4%
39.0%
39.1%
39.7%
41.1%
42.8%
45.7%
46.5%
38.7%

Boston
Baltimore
Indianapolis
Kansas City
Minneapolis
Cincinnati
Philadelphia
St. Louis
Buffalo
Chicago
Detroit
Cleveland
Milwaukee
Pittsburgh
Average

28.3%
31.6%
34.4%
34.9%
35.9%
36.3%
39.7%
40.1%
40.4%
42.1%
42.7%
42.7%
43.1%
48.3%
39.1%

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, American Community Survey, 2002 and 2005.
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Table 6:
Jobless Rates for Prime Working-Age Black Males in Metropolitan Areas:
2002-2005
Percentage of prime working-age (25-54) black males either
unemployed or out of the labor force
2002
Baltimore
Minneapolis
Cincinnati
Indianapolis
Cleveland
Boston
Pittsburgh
Kansas City
Detroit
Philadelphia
Buffalo
Chicago
Milwaukee
St. Louis
Average

2005
N/A
N/A
N/A
21.0%
21.1%
23.0%
24.0%
28.3%
31.2%
31.4%
32.0%
33.0%
33.5%
34.2%
28.4%

Boston
Baltimore
Indianapolis
Kansas City
Minneapolis
Cincinnati
Philadelphia
St. Louis
Chicago
Detroit
Cleveland
Buffalo
Milwaukee
Pittsburgh
Average

19.7%
21.5%
22.8%
25.2%
25.8%
26.4%
29.2%
30.6%
31.6%
32.0%
33.2%
33.7%
33.9%
37.3%
28.8%

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, American Community Survey, 2002 and 2005.
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Table 7:
Racial Disparity in Jobless Rates Among Working-Age Males
in Selected Metropolitan Areas: 2002-2005
Percentage difference by which the jobless rate for black
working-age males (16-64) exceeded white rate
2002
Baltimore
Minneapolis
Cincinnati
Cleveland
Pittsburgh
Indianapolis
Detroit
Boston
Philadelphia
Kansas City
Chicago
St. Louis
Buffalo
Milwaukee
Average

2005
N/A
N/A
N/A
8.7
10.3
12.4
15.0
16.1
19.7
19.9
20.8
21.9
22.7
27.8
17.8

Boston
Baltimore
Cincinnati
Buffalo
Indianapolis
Kansas City
Minneapolis
Philadelphia
Detroit
St. Louis
Cleveland
Chicago
Milwaukee
Pittsburgh
Average

8.9
13.6
15.0
15.2
15.5
16.5
19.2
19.2
19.9
20.1
21.8
22.7
23.0
24.2
18.2

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, American Community Survey, 2002 and 2005.
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Table 8:
Racial Disparity in Jobless Rates Among Prime Working-Age Males
in Selected Metropolitan Areas: 2002-2005
Percentage difference by which the jobless rate for black
prime working-age males (25-54) exceeded white rate
2002
Baltimore
Minneapolis
Cincinnati
Cleveland
Boston
Pittsburgh
Indianapolis
Detroit
Kansas City
Buffalo
Philadelphia
St. Louis
Chicago
Milwaukee
Average

2005
N/A
N/A
N/A
5.7
8.7
10.5
10.8
13.9
16.5
17.3
17.9
19.2
20.0
21.7
14.7

Boston
Indianapolis
Baltimore
Cincinnati
Kansas City
Philadelphia
Minneapolis
Buffalo
St. Louis
Detroit
Cleveland
Milwaukee
Chicago
Pittsburgh
Average

7.5
10.7
11.0
13.1
13.7
15.6
16.0
16.4
17.1
17.2
20.0
20.2
20.3
21.4
15.7

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, American Community Survey, 2002 and 2005.

The story between 2002 and 2005 is slightly different when we look at male jobless rates in
cities (Tables 9-12) as opposed to metropolitan areas. The black male jobless rate in the city of
Milwaukee declined slightly between 2002-2005, from 48.4 percent to 44.4 percent, while white
male joblessness in the city increased (from 20.6 percent to 25.5 percent); as a result, the racial
disparity in male joblessness in the city shrank markedly between 2002-2005 (see Table 11). 11
At the same time, as black male joblessness was declining in Milwaukee between 20022005, it rose in 9 of the 14 Northeast-Midwest big cities against which we have “benchmarked”
Milwaukee. Thus, the city’s relative ranking improved: in 2002, Milwaukee had the 14th highest
rate of black male joblessness of the 15 large Frostbelt cities; in 2005, Milwaukee ranked 7th,
right in the middle of the pack and around the Frostbelt average. In 2002, Milwaukee had the
widest racial disparity in male jobless rates of this pool of Northeast-Midwest big cities; in 2005,
Milwaukee had the 10th widest racial disparity among the 15 cities. 12
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The city-to-city comparisons, however, are somewhat misleading, because in metro
Milwaukee, unlike elsewhere in the Frostbelt, there has been virtually no suburbanization of the
working-age black male population. As Table 13 shows, 92 percent of metro Milwaukee’s
working-age black males live in the city of Milwaukee, a substantially higher proportion than the
Frostbelt average of 51.1 percent of metro area working-age black males living in central cities.
Thus, when we examine black male employment in cities, we’re effectively comparing virtually
Milwaukee’s entire metro area black male workforce to the half of the black male workforce
living in the central city in other metropolitan areas; the “half,” we should underscore, who are
generally among the region’s least-advantaged population. This is why the black male jobless
situation in Milwaukee, although hardly roseate, looks marginally better in city-to-city
comparisons than in comparisons at the metropolitan area level. For example, when we look at
just the central city, in 2005 the black male jobless rate in Milwaukee was actually 1.8
percentage points lower than in Minneapolis; however, when we compare the two metropolitan
areas, the black male jobless rate in Milwaukee was 7.2 points higher than in Minneapolis. This
is because in Minneapolis unlike Milwaukee, the majority of the region’s working-age black
males live in suburbs, where job growth is more rapid than in the city and where black male
jobless rates are much lower. 13 Indeed, as we shall examine shortly, Milwaukee’s low rate of
black suburbanization is a critical factor explaining the severity of the crisis of black male
joblessness here compared to other Frostbelt regions. 14
Thus, when comparing the employment situation of black males in Milwaukee to elsewhere
in the Frostbelt, the more meaningful comparisons are at the metropolitan area level. However,
the bottom line is that no matter whether we look at the city or metro Milwaukee as a whole, the
crisis of black male joblessness remains stark and persistent here. Notwithstanding indications of
modest improvement between 2002 and 2005, the jobless rate for black males in the city remains
high at 44.1 percent, and, as a region, Milwaukee still registers among the highest black male
jobless rates in the Frostbelt. In the next section of this study, we explore the structural and
historical factors that underpin the crisis of black male joblessness in Milwaukee.
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Table 9:
Black Male Jobless Rates in Selected Cities: 2002-2005
Percentage of working-age (16-64) black males either
unemployed or out of the labor force
2002
Minneapolis
Indianapolis
Columbus
Cleveland
Pittsburgh
Baltimore
Kansas City
Detroit
Boston
Cincinnati
Philadelphia
Buffalo
Chicago
Milwaukee
St. Louis
Average

2005
31.4%
31.5%
35.5%
36.5%
38.5%
39.4%
40.7%
41.2%
41.3%
44.1%
44.7%
46.9%
47.7%
48.2%
50.1%
41.2%

Boston
Kansas City
Indianapolis
Columbus
Cincinnati
Baltimore
Milwaukee
Buffalo
Philadelphia
Minneapolis
Chicago
Detroit
St. Louis
Cleveland
Pittsburgh
Average

33.6%
35.4%
37.1%
37.4%
39.0%
39.8%
44.4%
45.4%
45.9%
46.2%
48.3%
48.9%
49.2%
49.6%
55.9%
43.7%

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, American Community Survey, 2002 and 2005
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Table 10:
Jobless Rates for Prime Working-Age Black Males
in Selected Cities: 2002-2005
Percentage of prime working-age (25-54) black males either
unemployed or out of the labor force
2002
Indianapolis
Cleveland
Columbus
Boston
Minneapolis
Cincinnati
Baltimore
Kansas City
Buffalo
Milwaukee
Detroit
Pittsburgh
Philadelphia
Chicago
St. Louis
Average

2005
22.2%
25.7%
26.6%
26.6%
27.1%
28.1%
28.9%
33.5%
33.7%
34.2%
34.6%
36.1%
39.4%
41.3%
46.7%
32.3%

Boston
Indianapolis
Cincinnati
Kansas City
Columbus
Baltimore
Minneapolis
Philadelphia
Milwaukee
Buffalo
Chicago
Detroit
St. Louis
Cleveland
Pittsburgh
Average

24.9%
24.9%
28.6%
26.4%
28.7%
31.3%
32.6%
33.3%
34.6%
36.5%
37.7%
37.9%
40.1%
41.3%
49.0%
33.9%

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, American Community Survey, 2002 and 2005
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Table 11:
Racial Disparity in Jobless Rates Among Working-Age Males
in Selected Cities: 2002-2005
Percentage difference by which the jobless rate for black
working-age males (16-64) exceeded white rate
2002
Detroit
Cleveland
Columbus
Pittsburgh
Indianapolis
Minneapolis
Boston
Philadelphia
Cincinnati
Baltimore
Kansas City
Buffalo
Chicago
St. Louis
Milwaukee
Average

2005
(-3.2)
6.0
14.9
15.1
15.6
16.0
16.2
16.5
16.5
16.6
21.6
23.8
25.6
25.9
27.8
17.0

Detroit
Boston
Columbus
Buffalo
Indianapolis
Kansas City
Cincinnati
Baltimore
Philadelphia
Milwaukee
Cleveland
St. Louis
Minneapolis
Chicago
Pittsburgh
Average

7.4
10.2
13.7
15.4
15.6
16.0
16.6
18.4
16.9
18.9
19.4
24.6
27.3
29.6
30.8
18.7

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, American Community Survey, 2002 and 2005.
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Table 12:
Racial Disparity in Jobless Rates Among Prime Working-Age Males
in Selected Cities: 2002-2005
Percentage difference by which the jobless rate for black
prime working-age males (25-54) exceeded white rate
2002
Detroit
Cleveland
Boston
Cincinnati
Baltimore
Columbus
Indianapolis
Buffalo
Kansas City
Minneapolis
Pittsburgh
Philadelphia
Milwaukee
Chicago
St. Louis
Average

2005
(-7.2)
1.8
9.6
10.1
11.3
11.7
11.7
14.3
16.6
16.7
17.1
18.4
18.6
24.3
33.3
13.9

Detroit
Boston
Indianapolis
Cincinnati
Columbus
Buffalo
Philadelphia
Kansas City
Baltimore
Milwaukee
Cleveland
Minneapolis
St. Louis
Chicago
Pittsburgh
Average

4.0
6.5
8.6
10.8
10.9
12.4
12.4
13.6
15.6
15.9
17.3
19.0
21.6
25.6
32.9
15.1

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, American Community Survey, 2002 and 2005.
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Table 13:
Percentage of Metropolitan Area Working-Age Males Living
In Central City, By Race, in Selected Regions: 2005
METRO AREA
Milwaukee
Detroit
Buffalo
Cincinnati
Cleveland
Baltimore
Philadelphia
Kansas City
Chicago
Pittsburgh
Boston
St. Louis
Minneapolis
Average –All
Metro Areas

BLACK

WHITE

92.0%
65.8%
76.1%
52.1%
52.9%
52.0%
52.9%
56.0%
53.7%
45.2%
43.0%
32.9%
30.6%
51.1%

21.9%
2.7%
13.5%
8.7%
10.1%
11.0%
13.9%
18.1%
17.2%
9.9%
8.9%
7.4%
10.3%
11.8%

RACIAL
DISPARITY
70.1
63.1
62.6
43.4
42.8
41.0
39.0
37.9
36.5
35.3
34.1
25.5
20.3
39.3

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, American Community Survey, 2005.

V. Black Male Joblessness in Milwaukee, 1970-2005:
Historical Development and Explanatory Factors
The crisis of black male joblessness in Milwaukee has been in the making for over three
decades and has coincided with profound changes in the racial composition of the city’s labor
force and the geographic distribution of metropolitan Milwaukee’s working-age population.
Since 1970, the number of working-age black males in Milwaukee has more than doubled (from
25,267 to 57,916) while the number of working-age white males in the city has fallen by more
than 55 percent (from 174,350 to 77,751). In 1970, whites constituted 85.6 percent of
Milwaukee’s male working-age population; by 2005, as a result of three decades of white flight
combined with the growth of black and Hispanic populations, the working-age male population
in the city of Milwaukee had become majority-minority.
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Table 14:
Racial Change in the City of Milwaukee Male Labor Market: 1970-2005
(racial composition of working-age male population)
YEAR
1970
1980
1990
2000
2005

BLACK
25,267
38,124
48,464
55,216
57,916

WHITE
174,350
154,564
123,077
92,489
77,751

HISPANIC
4,129
7,627
11,254
23,969
26,319

% WHITE
85.6%
77.2%
67.3%
53.9%
48.0%

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of Population: Characteristics of the Population, Wisconsin (19702000); U.S. Bureau the Census, American Community Survey, 2005.

In addition to the changing racial composition of the city’s workforce, Milwaukee also
witnessed between 1970 and 2005 the emergence of the Frostbelt’s most racially segmented
regional labor market (with the possible exception of Detroit). White flight from the city
(especially after 1980), the settlement in the suburbs of the vast majority of white in-migrants to
the region, and Milwaukee’s extraordinarily low rate of black suburbanization all combined to
produce a distinct and growing geographic-racial divide in the metropolitan area’s male
workforce. As Table 15 shows, in 1970 nearly one-half of metro Milwaukee’s working-age
white male population lived in the city of Milwaukee; by 2005, the city share had fallen to barely
more than a fifth. Conversely, as we have already discussed, virtually all of metro Milwaukee’s
working-age black male population lives in the city of Milwaukee, a concentration that has
barely attenuated since 1970. Although the region’s Hispanic male workers are less concentrated
in the city than is the black workforce, the vast majority of working-age Hispanic males in metro
Milwaukee also reside in the city. In racial terms, then, metro Milwaukee has evolved since 1970
into two, highly segmented labor markets: one in suburbia, which is almost exclusively white;
the other, in the city, with a rapidly shrinking number of white workers and where “minorities”
now constitute a majority of the working-age male residents. As we will examine shortly, this
segmentation –an element of Milwaukee’s hyper-segregated residential patterns—plays a critical
role in shaping Milwaukee’s pattern of black male joblessness.
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Table 15:
Percentage of Metropolitan Milwaukee’s Working-Age Males
Living in the City of Milwaukee, By Race: 1970-2005

YEAR
1970
1980
1990
2000
2005

BLACK
97.7%
96.4%
95.5%
91.8%
92.0%

WHITE
47.5%
37.3%
33.1%
25.4%
21.9%

HISPANIC
71.7%
74.4%
77.0%
76.3%
67.8%

Source: Same as Table 14

It has been in this context of racial change that the crisis of black male joblessness has
unfolded in Milwaukee since 1970. The rise in black male joblessness in Milwaukee during the
past 35 years has been relentless, increasing substantially at each census measurement until
reaching a staggering 51.5 percent in 2003 (before improving to 44.1 percent by 2005).
Although black joblessness climbed sharply in Milwaukee during the 1970s, the real turning
point came during the brutal 1982 recession when the city hemorrhaged thousands of
manufacturing jobs 15 and, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the rate of black male
joblessness first passed 50 percent in the city. 16 Ever since then, Milwaukee’s black male jobless
rate has never dipped below 40 percent. White male joblessness has also climbed in Milwaukee
since the 1970s –a reflection of the general economic stagnation of the city over the past 30
years—but at a much slower rate than black male joblessness.
Consequently, Milwaukee’s racial gap in male joblessness, while not insignificant in 1970,
grew to giant proportions as early as 1980. As Table 16 shows, ever since 1980 black male
joblessness in Milwaukee has exceeded joblessness among white males living in the suburbs by
between 26 and 33 percentage points. Even in the city itself, the racial gap in joblessness
widened considerably over the past 30 years, from 10 points in 1970, to 29 points in 2004, before
falling back to 20 points according to the 2005 census figures.
Perhaps even more striking has been the growth in joblessness among prime working-age
black males in Milwaukee since 1970. As noted earlier, joblessness among males between the
ages of 25-54 is particularly revealing of the state of the local labor market; we’re much less
likely to see, in this age group, potential workers voluntarily absent from the labor market
because of schooling, retirement, or homemaking. In a percolating, full employment economy,
31

UWM Center for Economic Development

Table 16
Jobless Rates for Working-Age Males in Milwaukee: 1970-2005
% of working-age males unemployed or not in the
labor force, by race, ethnicity, and place of residence
YEAR
1970
1980
1990
2000
2002
2003
2004
2005

BLACKCITY
26.3
38.4
43.5
47.3
48.2
51.5
49.8
44.1

WHITECITY
16.0
22.3
20.4
21.4
20.4
24.7
20.7
25.5

WHITESUBURBS
13.1
12.3
12.3
14.2
18.1
20.4
17.4
18.3

HISPANIC
CITY
19.6
29.1
32.2
37.3
30.2
20.3 17
26.1
27.4

Source: Same as Table 14

we would expect to find very low rates of joblessness among prime working-age males;
effectively, in a healthy labor market, joblessness among these males would be frictional
unemployment (a relatively small number of workers, jobless for a short period – the proverbial
“workers between jobs”).
The jobless rate for prime working-age black males was 15.2 percent in 1970, relatively
modest by historical standards, albeit double the rate for white city residents and almost
quadruple the rate for suburbanites. 18 However, as was the case when we considered all
working-age black males, joblessness among prime-working age black males has grown
ceaselessly in Milwaukee since 1970, peaking at an astonishing 40.8 percent in 2003, before
improving to 34.6 percent by 2005. Consider, for a moment, what this signified: in 2003, four
out of every 10 black males in Milwaukee, in their prime working years, were either unemployed
or not even in the labor force seeking employment.
Concomitantly, Milwaukee’s racial gap in joblessness among prime working-age males has
widened consistently and considerably over the past 30 years. In 1970, as Table 17 shows, black
male joblessness in Milwaukee exceeded joblessness among white males living in the suburbs by
11 percentage points. By 1980, that gap had enlarged to 20 percentage points, and it has
oscillated between 22 and 31 percentage points ever since.
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Table 17
Jobless Rates for Prime Working-Age Males in Milwaukee: 1970-2005
% of working-age males unemployed or not in the
labor force, by race, ethnicity, and place of residence
YEAR
1970
1980
1990
2000
2002
2003
2004
2005

BLACKCITY
15.2
24.5
34.6
38.7
34.2
40.8
34.5
34.6

WHITECITY
7.4
9.8
12.2
16.2
15.6
17.9
17.9
18.7

WHITESUBURBS
4.1
3.9
8.8
8.4
10.4
9.6
10.4
11.8

HISPANIC
CITY
9.8
9.6
24.9
32.8
27.0
14.3 19
22.5
21.2

Source: Same as Table 14

Even if we limit the comparison to black and white prime working-age males living in the
city of Milwaukee, the racial gap in joblessness has widened considerably over the past 30 years,
from 8 points in 1970, to 22 points in 2004, before falling back to 16 points according to the
2005 census figures.
How did Milwaukee reach this disastrous state of affairs? What factors transformed
Milwaukee from a city that in 1970 boasted the lowest jobless rates for black males in the
Frostbelt, to a city that today struggles with black male jobless rates above 40 percent and racial
disparities in employment that are among the widest in the Frostbelt? Understanding why black
male joblessness has become so pervasive and entrenched in Milwaukee is an essential step to
identifying promising policies to alleviate the situation.
Three key factors present in all Frostbelt metropolises –deindustrialization, suburbanization,
and racial segregation—have come together in a particularly virulent combination in Milwaukee
to produce one of urban America’s most acute crises of black male joblessness. First, as is now
well established, deindustrialization has been a fundamental element in Milwaukee’s general
economic decline since the 1970s, and it has been especially devastating for working-age black
males in the city. In 1970, 55.4 percent of Milwaukee’s black male workers were employed in
manufacturing, compared to 42.2 percent of the city’s white male workers; thus, when
Milwaukee began shedding factory jobs in the 1970s, black workers were more “at risk.” 20 As
we have previously argued: “[W]ith a disproportionate segment of its labor force employed in
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manufacturing, black Milwaukee experienced disproportionate economic distress while the city
deindustrialized in the 1970s and 1980s.” 21 Moreover, this racial disparity in manufacturing
employment was greater in Milwaukee than in any other Frostbelt city in 1970, which helps
explain how, when deindustrialization hit, Milwaukee fell from having among the lowest rates of
black male joblessness in the Frostbelt in 1970 to among the highest by 1990 and thereafter. As
Table 18 shows, the number of black males employed in manufacturing declined by almost 3,000
between 1970-2000 (even as Milwaukee’s working-age black male population was growing by
almost 30,000 during this period). Manufacturing was a critical source of jobs for Milwaukee’s
black males through the 1970s, and, to a greater degree than anywhere else in the Frostbelt,
industrial decline fundamentally diminished black male employment opportunities in the city. 22

Table 18:
Race and Manufacturing Employment in Milwaukee: 1970-2000
(number of males employed in manufacturing,
by race and place of residence)
Black
PLACE
City
Suburbs
Metro
Milwaukee

1970
10,970
93
11,063

White
2000
7,527
629
8,156

1970
70,112
69,725
139,837

Hispanic
2000
17,583
70,496
88,079

1970
1,764
756
2,420

2000
5,631
2,103
7,734

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of Population: Characteristics of the Population, Wisconsin, 1970;
U.S. Bureau of the Census, American Factfinder, Census 2000 (Table PCT 85)

Second, although Milwaukee’s deindustrialization is often carelessly and simplistically
attributed to the challenges of “globalization,” it has been the suburbanization of jobs in metro
Milwaukee –including manufacturing-- that has contributed mightily to the region’s crisis of
black male joblessness. Contrary to the image of a deindustrializing region, the number of males
employed in manufacturing and living in Milwaukee’s suburbs, regardless of race or ethnicity,
has actually increased since 1970; but, of course, the overwhelming majority (96.3 percent) of
these suburban-based manufacturing workers are white. In fact, as Table 19 shows, the number
of manufacturing jobs located in Milwaukee’s “exurban” suburbs of Ozaukee, Washington, and
Waukesha Counties has tripled since the early 1960s. 23 On the other hand, the city of
Milwaukee –where, as we have seen, over 90 percent of the region’s black male working-age
population lives—has lost over 70 percent of its manufacturing jobs since the 1960s. By 2002, in
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fact, there were twice as many manufacturing jobs in the exurban counties of metro Milwaukee
than in the city, the putative industrial center of the region.
The suburbanization of manufacturing, of course, reflects the larger decentralization of the
Milwaukee region’s overall employment base that has been underway for over 30 years. Since
1980, all of the net job growth in metro Milwaukee has been in the suburbs, with the largest
increases in the exurban counties (see Table 20). The city of Milwaukee has lost almost 18
percent of its job base since 1980. Although the job location data presented here run only
through 2002, data on the employment of residents suggests that economic decentralization
continues unchecked in the Milwaukee region. According to the federal Bureau of Labor
Statistics, metro Milwaukee as a whole has experienced employment decline since 2000, but it
has been in the city of Milwaukee where the decline in the number of employed residents has
been the greatest (7.2 percent between 2000-2005). Despite boosterish talk of a Milwaukee
“renaissance” in recent years, the hollowing out of the city’s employment base has continued
unabated.
Table 19
The Suburbanization of Manufacturing in Metro Milwaukee: 1963-2002
Number of manufacturing jobs located in various jurisdictions
YEAR

1963
1967
1977
1982
1987
1997
2002
% change,
1963-2002
% change
1982-2002

CITY OF
MILWAUKEE
119,284
118,600
91,400
77,900
63,900
46,467
34,957
-70.7%

MILWAUKEE
COUNTY
SUBURBS
56,051
62,500
62,200
51,400
43,100
40,466
32,654
-41.7%

-55.1%

-36.5%

EXURBAN
COUNTIES*
24,858
35,400
50,500
51,100
57,000
78,210
71,386
+187.1%

% OF REGION
INDUSTRIAL
JOBS IN CITY
59.6%
54.8%
44.8%
43.2%
40.0%
28.1%
25.1%

+39.7%

*Ozaukee, Washington, and Waukesha Counties
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, County and City Data Book (various years);
U.S. Bureau of the Census, Economic Census: Geographic Area Series (various years).
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Table 20:
Where Milwaukeeans Work: The Decentralization of Jobs in
Metropolitan Milwaukee, 1980-2000
Number of jobs located in various jurisdictions
YEAR

CITY OF
MILWAUKEE

MILWAUKEE
COUNTY
SUBURBS

331,982
314,960
285,260
273,014
-17.8%

161,282
168,634
178,654
185,380
+14.9%

1980
1990
2000
2002
% change
19802002

EXURBAN
COUNTIES

165,966
227,457
296,676
301,321
+81.6%

% OF
REGION’S
JOBS IN
CITY
50.2%
44.3%
37.5%
35.9%

Sources: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Journey To Work (1980, 1990, 2000); U.S. Department of Housing and
Urban Development, State of the Cities Data System: County Business Patterns Special Extract (2002); U.S.
Bureau of the Census, County Business Patterns (2002)

Table 21:
Where Workers Live: Employed Residents in Metro Milwaukee, 2000-2005
Number of employed working-age residents, by place of residence
YEAR
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
% change
2000-2005

CITY OF
MILWAUKEE
268,473
262,951
255,879
252,032
249,622
249,095
-7.2%

MILW. CO.
EXURBAN COS.
SUBURBS
189,617
320,352
187,676
319,294
183,287
315,810
180,987
316,858
180,888
318,386
180,506
317,715
-4.8%
-0.8%

Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Local Area Unemployment Statistics (2000-2005).
Annual employment averages.

Finally, the suburbanization of jobs in metropolitan Milwaukee, especially in
manufacturing, has combined with the region’s entrenched residential segregation to produce a
“spatial mismatch” in the regional labor market. This mismatch has severely limited employment
possibilities for the region’s black males. To put it bluntly: the overwhelming majority of the
region’s working-age black males live in a city with an eroding employment base, while all of
the net job growth in the region is occurring in exurban areas where few blacks live and to which
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city-based minority workers have minimal transportation access. 24 Table 22 shows the degree to
which the suburban labor market is terra incognita for black workers in Milwaukee. 25 Through
2000, just over 8,500 black workers in metropolitan Milwaukee –only 11 percent of all black
workers in the region—had secured employment in the exurban counties, representing a tiny
fraction of the exurban workforce. By contrast, 43.1 percent of the region’s white workers were
employed in the exurban counties in 2000. This racial disparity is equally apparent when we
take into account all suburban employment (i.e. the exurban counties and the Milwaukee County
suburbs). While 29.7 percent of metro Milwaukee’s black workers were employed in the suburbs
in 2000, 67.1 percent of the region’s white workforce held a job in suburbia. These data run
through 2000, but given the stagnant job growth throughout the regional labor market over the
past five years, there is no reason to believe that Milwaukee’s spatial mismatch has improved
since then. 26
Table 22:
Where Do Blacks Hold Jobs in Metro Milwaukee?
LOCATION
City of Milwaukee
(excluding downtown)
Downtown Milwaukee
Milwaukee County Suburbs
Waukesha County
Washington County
Ozaukee County
Metro Milwaukee (total)

TOTAL
WORKFORCE
222,674

BLACK
WORKFORCE
41,432

BLACK %
OF TOTAL
18.6%

62,645
178,605
208,470
48,400
39,130
760,014

8,345
14,649
6,553
1,250
1,250
72,960

13.3%
8.2%
3.1%
3.2%
2.7%
9.6%

Source: CED analysis of U.S. Census Transportation Planning Package (CTPP) data on
place of work, based on 2000 census.

Although all of metro Milwaukee’s net job growth has occurred in exurbia in recent years,
downtown Milwaukee has been one of the few bright spots in an otherwise dismal city labor
market since the early 1990s. Downtown Milwaukee gained 3,442 jobs between 1994 and 2004,
according to the U.S. Census Bureau. 27 However, as Table 22 shows, blacks made up only 13.3
percent of the downtown workforce, according to the 2000 census. What’s more, over threefifths (61.2 percent) of these workers earned under $25,000 a year. 28 In short, not only has job
growth in downtown Milwaukee provided few employment opportunities for black workers, but,
in addition, the bulk of downtown jobs secured by blacks do not pay a family-supporting wage. 29
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In sum, a convergence of trends --deindustrialization, suburbanization, and racial
segregation-- has systematically diminished the employment prospects for black males in
Milwaukee since the 1970s. These developments are common, of course, to all Frostbelt
metropolises; but, Milwaukee’s uniquely low rate of black suburbanization, combined with a
historically high reliance of Milwaukee’s black male workers on now-vanishing manufacturing
jobs, has produced a particularly acute employment crisis for black males in the city.
Milwaukee’s especially pronounced mismatch between the geography of race and the geography
of job growth has helped generate persistent, high rates of black male joblessness in the region.
Two other factors –intra- and inter-regional disparities in educational attainment as well as
the age structure of Milwaukee’s black male community-- also help explain both racial
differences in male joblessness in Milwaukee, as well as why the employment picture for black
males is especially dismal here compared to other cities and regions. First, as is well established,
educational attainment is a critical variable shaping employment prospects in increasingly postindustrial, knowledge-based economies. There is a substantial racial gap in male educational
attainment in Milwaukee; in the metropolitan area, for example, white males are almost three
times as likely as black males to hold college, professional, or advanced degrees, a disparity that
mirrors the racial disparity in male joblessness.

Table 23:
Milwaukee’s Racial Gap in Educational Attainment
% of males, 25 and older, with high school,
college or advanced degrees, by race
% High School grad
(includes some college)
PLACE
City of Milwaukee
Metropolitan Milwaukee

BLACK

WHITE

58.9%
58.1%

% college, professional/
or advanced degree
BLACK

58.9%
57.4%

8.4%
9.9%

WHITE
18.5%
28.5%

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, American Factfinder, Census 2000 Summary File 4

38

UWM Center for Economic Development

The elevated rate of black male joblessness in Milwaukee compared to other Frostbelt
cities and regions also appears to be attributable, to some extent, to inter-regional disparities in
educational attainment among black males. High school graduation rates among black males are
similar in Milwaukee and other Frostbelt cities and regions. However, Milwaukee lags
considerably behind most other Frostbelt metropolises in the percentage of black males holding
college, professional, or advanced degrees (see Tables 24 and 25).

Table 24:
Comparative Educational Attainment of
Black Males In Frostbelt Cities
% of black males, 25 and older, with high school,
college or advanced degrees
CITY

% HIGH
SCHOOL
GRADUATE*

Baltimore
Boston
Buffalo
Cincinnati
Chicago
Cleveland
Columbus
Detroit
Indianapolis
Kansas City
Milwaukee
Minneapolis
Philadelphia
Pittsburgh
St. Louis
AVERAGE15 cities
Source: Same as Table 23

54.4%
56.2%
60.8%
57.3%
56.6%
59.2%
62.6%
60.0%
61.4%
61.7%
58.9%
60.7%
57.2%
60.2%
56.0%
58.9%

% COLLEGE,
PROFESSIONAL,
OR ADVANCED
DEGREE
8.7%
16.0%
9.1%
9.9%
12.2%
5.5%
14.5%
8.2%
13.3%
10.7%
8.4%
15.3%
9.6%
11.7%
8.0%
10.7%

*includes some college work and associate degrees

Second, the age structure of Milwaukee’s working-age black male population also
contributes partially to explaining racial disparities in male joblessness in the city and region, as
well as differences in black male joblessness between Milwaukee and other Frostbelt
metropolises. Younger workers –those between the ages of 16 and 24—are more likely to be
jobless in all cities and regions; as Tables 2 and 3 showed, Milwaukee is no exception. But, in
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Milwaukee, a much higher proportion (28.0 percent) of working-age black males than white
males (13.7 percent) fall into the 16 to 24 year-old age category; thus, as a younger community,
working-age black males in the aggregate in Milwaukee are more likely to be jobless than white
males. 30

Table 25:
Comparative Educational Attainment of
Black Males In Frostbelt Metropolitan Areas
% of black males, 25 and older, with high school,
college or advanced degrees
METROPOLITAN
AREA

% HIGH
SCHOOL
GRADUATE*

Baltimore
Boston
Buffalo
Cincinnati
Chicago
Cleveland
Columbus
Detroit
Indianapolis
Kansas City
Milwaukee
Minneapolis
Philadelphia
Pittsburgh
St. Louis
AVERAGE-15
cities
Source: Same as Table 23

56.6%
54.9%
57.9%
59.4%
58.1%
61.0%
61.7%
59.9%
61.4%
62.1%
58.1%
59.4%
58.3%
63.4%
59.9%
59.5%

% COLLEGE,
PROFESSIONAL,
OR ADVANCED
DEGREE
14.4%
21.5%
9.9%
12.3%
14.3%
9.8%
15.5%
11.1%
14.0%
13.8%
9.9%
20.9%
12.2%
13.0%
11.9%
13.6%

*includes some college work and associate degrees

In the same vein, the “youth” component of Milwaukee’s working-age black male
population is higher than in every other large Frostbelt city. Moreover, as Tables 26 and 27
show, Milwaukee’s younger black male population is also significantly less likely than black
male counterparts in other Frostbelt cities and metro areas to have attended college or secured
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bachelor’s or more advanced degrees. Only 16.1 percent of metropolitan Milwaukee’s black
males between the ages 18 to 24 reported various levels of post high-school education in 2000,
compared to an average of 27.7 percent in the “benchmark” Frostbelt regions (see Table 27).
This combination of comparative youth and limited educational attainment among Milwaukee’s
working-age black males clearly is a factor shaping the region’s labor market.

Table 26:
Comparative Educational Attainment of
Young Black Males In Frostbelt Cities
% of black males, ages 18-24, with high school
degree and at least some college attendance
CITY
Baltimore
Boston
Buffalo
Cincinnati
Chicago
Cleveland
Columbus
Detroit
Indianapolis
Kansas City
Milwaukee
Minneapolis
Philadelphia
Pittsburgh
St. Louis
AVERAGE-15
cities

% HIGH SCHOOL
GRADUATE
35.7%
31.6%
34.2%
28.6%
32.7%
30.3%
34.0%
35.7%
30.9%
36.4%
36.4%
30.8%
36.8%
36.3%
35.7%
33.7%

% POST HIGH SCHOOL
EDUCATION*
25.3%
34.2%
28.2%
24.0%
27.0%
18.5%
33.2%
24.1%
27.1%
23.3%
15.3%
25.7%
25.8%
33.9%
18.3%
25.6%

*Includes: some college attendance, associate degree, bachelor’s degree, advanced and professional degrees.
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, American Factfinder. Census 2000 Summary File 4. Table PCT 65
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Table 27:
Comparative Educational Attainment of
Young Black Males In Frostbelt Metropolitan Areas
% of black males, ages 18-24, with high school
degree and at least some college attendance
METROPOLITAN AREA
Baltimore
Boston
Buffalo
Cincinnati
Chicago
Cleveland
Columbus
Detroit
Indianapolis
Kansas City
Milwaukee
Minneapolis
Philadelphia
Pittsburgh
St. Louis
AVERAGE-15 cities

% HIGH SCHOOL
GRADUATE
34.9%
31.6%
30.5%
30.2%
33.6%
32.3%
32.8%
35.0%
31.9%
38.9%
36.6%
31.9%
34.7%
38.4%
35.4%
33.9%

% POST-HIGH SCHOOL
EDUCATION*
29.9%
37.0%
30.2%
26.3%
29.6%
21.7%
31.4%
26.8%
26.1%
25.6%
16.1%
29.2%
28.4%
33.2%
23.5%
27.7%

*Includes: some college, associate degree, bachelor’s degree, advanced and professional degrees
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, American Factfinder. Census 2000 Summary File 4. Table PCT 65

However, although clearly part of the picture, these educational and demographic issues are
hardly determinative in explaining Milwaukee’s black male joblessness. Chicago, Cleveland and
Buffalo, for example, with lower “youth components” of their black male working-age
populations than Milwaukee, 31 nevertheless had comparable rates of black male joblessness in
2005. Pittsburgh recorded a black male jobless rate in the city of 55.9 percent in 2005, despite a
rate of post-high school education among young black males more than twice as high as
Milwaukee’s. Clearly, in many settings, macroeconomic and other socio-economic factors trump
education and demography in shaping labor market outcomes.
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Nevertheless, these educational and demographic factors –added to the issues of
deindustrialization, suburbanization, and segregation analyzed earlier—underscore the
complicated forces shaping Milwaukee’s crisis of black male joblessness. These are daunting
structural challenges requiring bold and comprehensive policies; however, Milwaukee’s policy
response to this jobs crisis has been anything but “bold and comprehensive.” Moreover, as we
shall see, the main strategies currently pursued in Milwaukee are unlikely to make much of a
dent in the city’s soaring rate of black joblessness.

VI. Local Policy and the Crisis of Black Male Joblessness in
Milwaukee
Although Milwaukee’s black male jobless rate first climbed over 50 percent by the early
1980s, Milwaukee’s civic leadership hardly attacked the problem with urgency or
aggressiveness. Henry Maier was Milwaukee’s mayor for 28 years, between 1960-1988, and the
problems of inner city poverty and joblessness in the city’s burgeoning black community were
not, to put it mildly, policy priorities during his tenure. Therefore, notwithstanding the surge in
black joblessness during Maier’s tenure, it is not surprising that little attention was paid to the
issue as city leaders adopted, in the words of one analyst, a “see-no-evil-hear-no-evil
tendency.” 32
Maier’s successor as mayor, John O. Norquist, also saw little need for energetic
government action, despite black male jobless rates that never dipped below 40 percent during
his tenure. The city, in Norquist’s view, was an “efficient marketplace,” and activist government
–which Norquist likened to “building a city on pity”-- was likely to create more economic
problems than it solved, he believed. 33 Indeed, Norquist adopted the curious stance that
predominantly black inner city neighborhoods in Milwaukee, despite pervasive and increasing
poverty, actually contained higher purchasing power –and hence presumably more “marketbased” economic development potential—than the seemingly more prosperous and rapidly
growing suburbs ringing the city. Thus, one of his main responses to the crisis of black
joblessness in the city was to publicize “purchasing power profiles” that would encourage
heretofore-reticent developers to recognize Milwaukee’s “efficient” yet untapped markets, invest
in the central city and presumably create jobs. 34 The job-creation efficacy of Norquist’s market
fundamentalism was unimpressive: during his tenure as mayor, the number of employed
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residents in the city of Milwaukee declined by nearly 10 percent, and among the nation’s 50
largest cities, Milwaukee ranked 47th in employment growth –hardly propitious “market”
conditions to alleviate the crisis of black male joblessness. 35 Unsurprisingly, over Norquist’s
four terms as mayor the city’s black male jobless rate jumped substantially, by more than17
percent. 36
In the early 1990s, the issue of black joblessness did briefly move to the forefront of
Milwaukee’s political agenda. The catalyst was the vociferous political theatre of Alderman
Michael McGee (Sr.), who threatened violence if the city’s crisis of black joblessness and inner
city poverty were not alleviated by 1995. McGee’s heated rhetoric generated embarrassing
national publicity for Milwaukee, including coverage by The New York Times and CBS’ 60
Minutes, and prompted the city’s business elite to establish an “Minority Employment Task
Force.” Co-chaired by the quintessential political odd couple --McGee and Hal Kuehl, head of
Greater Milwaukee Committee (GMC) and CEO of the First Wisconsin bank-- the chief policy
outcome of this task force was the creation in 1992 of the GMC’s “Employer Accords Program.”
A voluntary program in which participating companies agreed to a goal that at least 10 percent of
their new hires would be minorities, the accords generated about 8,500 new minority hires by
2000, according to the GMC. 37 The Employer Accords, however, were more a symbolic policy
response than a real jobs program. Whatever increased minority hiring occurred through the
accords was inadequate to keep pace with growth in the city’s black working-age population and
effectively combat joblessness; in fact, between 1990 and 2000, the black male jobless rate in
Milwaukee rose from 43.5 to 47.3 percent (see Table 16).
Today, Milwaukee Mayor Tom Barrett and the region’s corporate leadership in the GMC
and MMAC appear to have settled into a three-pronged “jobs strategy” to combat predominantly
minority inner city joblessness: workforce development, minority entrepreneurship, and
regionalism. 38 All are worthy policy objectives and, in principle, can contribute to improving the
local labor market. All, however, are deeply flawed as cornerstones of a local jobs strategy; in
particular, without other more direct job creation policies, these approaches are unlikely to have
a significant impact on the crisis of black male joblessness in Milwaukee.
First, let’s consider workforce development and job training, which have become the
mantras of virtually every “jobs” strategy in Milwaukee since the mid-1990s. The list of trainingcentered jobs initiatives in Milwaukee is long and growing: the Wisconsin Regional Training
Partnership (1992); the Milwaukee Jobs Initiative (1997); the Initiative for a Competitive
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Milwaukee (2002); the “GROW” initiative (2005); and the Regional Workforce Alliance (2006)
– to say nothing of the substantial, ongoing training operations of area technical colleges and
private industry councils. In February 2007, Mayor Barrett proposed yet another training
program: a “Mayor’s Office of Workforce Development,” which would be an “employerdemand driven system,” coordinating existing services and eliminating duplication. 39 Barrett
squarely placed his proposal in the context of the need to attack the crisis of black male
joblessness in Milwaukee: “In a city where in some neighborhoods, 58% of African-American
men are not employed, I am not going to take a passive role,” said the mayor. 40
Yet, on the face of it, Barrett’s workforce development plan appears no different than the
“training-is-the-answer” initiatives that have preceded it. All have promised to be “employerdriven,” streamlined, and coordinated; thus, these intentions hardly mark the Barrett plan as a
new departure. Yet, the earlier training initiatives have all fallen short in alleviating Milwaukee’s
employment crisis. For example, the Milwaukee Jobs Initiative (MJI), sponsored by the Greater
Milwaukee Committee, was touted as a “new” kind of training program, one that would “build
well-marked routes from the neighborhoods to jobs with career potential,” providing “transition
to work” support, and involving employers to design” special orientation and training programs
in collaboration with trade associations, educators, union officials, and community leaders.” 41
“This is a new jobs initiative that actually is working,” said Robert H. Milbourne, then-executive
director of the GMC. “It is employer-linked,” said Milbourne. “We go to the employer first, and
therefore, when people are trained, they receive training, not just for the hope of getting a job,
but for real jobs that exist before the training begins.” 42 However, seven years after the MJI was
launched, foundation funding 43 ran out and it was abandoned, having self-reported the placement
of a paltry 2,100 workers in jobs over the life of the initiative.
Closely linked to MJI was the Wisconsin Regional Training Partnership (WRTP). Created
in 1992 and still operating today, WRTP is a self-described labor market “intermediary,” pulling
together a consortium of manufacturers, unions and public sector partners “to support the
creation of high-performance workplaces and quality jobs in the Milwaukee region.” The WRTP
claims to have assembled almost 100 member firms in the consortium, with combined
employment of 65,000 in metro Milwaukee manufacturing. 44 The “value-added” to the regional
labor market by WRTP is described as follows:
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At the core of the partnership are a series of channels for active communication and
planning between employers and unions…Most of the employers either have or will have
an on-site training center that provides continuous training and skill upgrading. A key
component is the development of industry-specific skill standards, by employers, unions,
and technical colleges in the region…. In addition, the partnership has embarked on two
major initiatives to systematize access to entry-level jobs (a youth apprenticeship program
and a training program for inner-city residents). 45
WRTP has garnered national attention as a “model” regional training network, and the
president of the Greater Milwaukee Committee, representing the city’s business elite, says: “The
workforce development programs of WRTP have become an important economic development
asset for economic growth and prosperity in our region.” 46 But, the praise seems extravagant -as do claims of the partnership’s impact on the Milwaukee labor market. 47 According to the
program’s architects: “The aggregate results of the WRTP are impressive. Taken together,
WRTP members have stabilized manufacturing employment in the Milwaukee metro area, and
indeed contributed about 6,000 additional industrial jobs to it…Direct training reaches some
6,000 workers (one-quarter of whom are people of color)…” 48
In fact, since WRTP began operating in 1992, manufacturing employment –the target of
the partnership—has not “stabilized”: it has declined by an astonishing 37 percent in the city of
Milwaukee, the epicenter of partnership activity, and by 14 percent for metropolitan Milwaukee
as a whole. 49 Moreover, several companies listed as WRTP members –Tower Automotive,
Master Lock, and Johnson Controls—were responsible for significant layoffs and plant closings
in Milwaukee’s inner city during the 1990s (and beyond) when WRTP was allegedly
“reforming” labor relations at member companies. 50 Hyperbolic claims about the impact of
WRTP may have generated substantial foundation grants and consulting contracts for the
partnership, but there is very little evidence that this workforce development program has had a
significant impact on local job creation or the functioning of the Milwaukee regional labor
market.
Why have these past workforce development efforts failed to reduce Milwaukee’s black
male jobless rate – and why is the Barrett administration’s new plan, as well as other new
training programs in the region, equally unlikely to succeed? The answer is simple: workforce
development policy in Milwaukee and elsewhere is based on the fallacious assumptions that
enough jobs exist for properly trained workers, or that with adequate training enough privatesector jobs will materialize for all workers. As Louis Uchitelle has written in his important book,
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The Disposable American: Layoffs and their Consequences: “The myth –promoted by
economists, educators, business executives, and nearly all of the nation’s political leaders,
Democrats and Republicans alike—holds that in America’s vibrant and flexible economy there is
work, at good pay, for the educated and skilled. The unemployed need only to get themselves
educated and skilled and the work will materialize. Education and training create jobs, according
to this way of thinking.” 51
This is a “supply-side” approach to the labor market: train the unemployed and they will
be prepared for skilled jobs that currently go unfilled in metropolitan areas, or new jobs will be
created by private employers to take advantage of increasing skills in the workforce. 52 However,
as Timothy Bartik of the Upjohn Institute has pointed out, “a key limitation of labor supply
programs is that…they do nothing to create additional jobs for the poor.” 53 Thus, Bartik argues,
when we “train low-education persons and then push them into the labor market, the private
labor market will not create a sufficient number of jobs to employ all these labor market entrants.
One possibility is that one-third to two-thirds of the labor market entrants will fail to obtain jobs.
Alternatively, if more of the new entrants obtain jobs, their success will come at the expense of
other low-education workers who will lose jobs, displaced because fewer job vacancies will be
available.” Moreover, without policies to increase the demand for labor, increasing the supply of
new workers (regardless of their “customized” job training) will exert downward pressure on the
wages of all low- to moderate-skill workers. In other words, particularly in stagnant labor
markets like Milwaukee’s, what labor economist Gordon Lafer has called the “job training
charade” will fail to significantly improve employment prospects for the jobless; moreover,
absent job creation policies to increase the demand for low- and moderate-skilled labor, “supply
side” policies like job training can have the perverse impact of depressing wages and increasing
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the number of the working poor. 54 Thus, concludes Lafer:
Whatever the problem, it seems, job training is the answer. The only trouble
is, it doesn’t work, and the government knows it. The most comprehensive
evaluation of training programs, conducted by the Department of Labor,
followed 20,000 people over four years. For the vast majority, the government
concluded that training made no difference at all.
It is tempting to think that these meager results are due to mismanagement in
one program. However, every training program reports similar anemic
outcomes, whether publicly or privately run, for welfare recipients, high
school dropouts or laid-off union workers. Indeed, in studying more than 40
years of job training policy, I have not seen one program that, on average,
enabled its participants to earn their way out of poverty. 55
Unfortunately, civic leadership in Milwaukee –from Mayor Barrett to the presidents of the
MMAC and GMC to the editorial board of the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel-- has apparently
adopted the myth that there enough jobs paying a living wage in metropolitan Milwaukee for all
able-bodied jobless; that the core of Milwaukee’s employment problem is that it suffers from a
shortage of skilled workers (a “jobs-skills mismatch”) rather than a shortage of jobs; and that
therefore job training should be the centerpiece of a local “jobs strategy.” As the Journal Sentinel
recently editorialized on Barrett’s workforce development plan: “Too many people, especially
those in the city, go without work while blue-collar jobs in area companies with good wages and
benefits go unfilled.” 56 And this from Julia Taylor and Tim Sheehy, presidents of the GMC and
MMAC, respectively: “Our call to action as a community is to meet the need for a skilled work
force and to link our inner city residents to jobs. The jobs are already here. Daily, calls come
from employers looking for a prepared work force (emphasis added).” 57
The jobs are already here? This is quite a statement in a region that has experienced a four
percent employment decline since 2000 (with a seven percent drop in the city of Milwaukee
alone). 58 In fact, much more than a skills shortage, metro Milwaukee faces an imposing jobs
shortage. As Table 28 shows, there is a huge gap in the Milwaukee region between the number
of jobless, and the number of available jobs, a gap that has increased significantly since 2000 as
the region’s job creation machinery has sputtered. Put another way, there simply are not enough
jobs available in the region to provide full-employment to the working-age population –a
sobering reality that is further complicated, as we examined earlier, by racial segregation and a
spatial mismatch between the inner city jobless and the location of available jobs in the region.
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Data on job vacancies in metropolitan Milwaukee are available from an annual survey of
employers conducted for the Milwaukee County Private Industry Council by the University of
Wisconsin-Milwaukee Employment and Training Institute. To calculate whether “the jobs are
already here” or whether Milwaukee suffers from a jobs shortage, we have compared these job
availability numbers, in 2000 and 2005, with the number of working-age jobless during those
years, by race and sex, in Milwaukee. For the purposes of this analysis, we have excluded from
the tabulation of the jobless: 1) teenagers (many of whom are students or otherwise voluntarily
not in the labor force); and 2) working-age females not in labor force, many of whom are out of
the labor force for voluntary reasons (such as “stay-at-home” mothers). We know, however, that
at least some teenagers and working-age females are clearly involuntarily out of the labor force;
thus, the large gap we have calculated between “available workers” and “available jobs” is a
conservative estimate that actually understates the extent to which there is a job shortage in
metro Milwaukee for the working-age population.
In 2000, as Table 28 shows, metro Milwaukee had 91,676 potential job-seekers (workingage residents between the ages of 20-64 who were unemployed or out of the labor force), but
employers reported only 38,314 job vacancies; thus, metro Milwaukee faced a shortage of
53,362 jobs. By 2005, this job gap had grown to 88,294. There were six jobless Milwaukeeans
for every available job in 2005; there were an astounding nine jobless for every available fulltime job. 59 In fact, in 2005 there were more jobless working-age black males alone (20,768) than
there were total job vacancies (18,772) in metropolitan Milwaukee.
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Table 28:
Metro Milwaukee’s Job Gap: 2000-2005
The Gap Between Available Jobs and the Jobless in the Region
number of residents, ages 20-64, by race and sex, either
officially unemployed or not in the labor force; and
number of job vacancies reported in employer survey
2000
GROUP
White Males
Black Males
Hispanic Males
All Females
Total (A)

Job Vacancies
Total (B)

UNEMPLOYED
9,160
5,801
1,837
14,793
31,591

OUT OF LABOR
FORCE
36,809
16,572
6,704
N/C
60,085

Full-Time
24,242

Part-Time
14,072

Shortage of Available Jobs (A minus B)

2005
GROUP
White Males
Black Males
Hispanic Males
All Females
Total (A)
Job Vacancies
Total (B)

UNEMPLOYED
15,159
6,004
4,510
20,132
45,805
Full-Time
12,381

Shortage of Available Jobs (A minus B)

TOTAL JOBLESS
45,969
22,373
8,541
14,793
91,676

Total Vacancies
38,314
53,362

OUT OF LABOR TOTAL JOBLESS
FORCE
41,378
56,537
14,764
20,768
5,119
9,629
N/C
20,132
61,261
107,132
Part-Time
6,391

Total Vacancies
18,772
88,294

N/C = not calculated
Sources: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census 2000, Summary File 4; U.S. Bureau of the Census, American Community Survey,
2005; and University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, Employment and Training Institute, Milwaukee Area Job Openings Survey,
May 2006, p. 14; and University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee Employment and Training Institute, Survey of Job Openings in the
Milwaukee Metropolitan Area: Week of May 15, 2000, p. 1.

These job gap calculations make abundantly clear just how misguided is the diagnosis of
the local labor market by Mayor Barrett and the leaders of the GMC and MMAC. Given
Milwaukee’s gap between available jobs and available workers, public policy predicated on the
belief that “the jobs are already here” and that a new office of workforce development constitutes
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a “jobs strategy” is a recipe for failure and will do little to bring down Milwaukee’s staggeringly
high rate of black male joblessness. To repeat: it is a jobs shortage, much more than a skills
shortage that plagues the Milwaukee economy.
This point is further underscored when we look at the skills requirements for occupations
that have been identified by the Bureau of Labor Statistics as those likely to exhibit the greatest
growth in the next decade. As Table 29 shows, the vast majority of
Table 29:
The 10 Occupations With Largest Projected
Job Growth Nationally, 2004-14
Numbers of jobs in thousands
OCCUPATION

2004

2014

#

MOST SIGNIFICANT
SOURCE OF POSTSECONDARY EDUCATION
OR TRAINING
Short-term on-the-job training
Associate degree
Doctoral degree
Moderate-term on-the-job
training
Short-term on-the-job training
Short-term on-the-job training
Short-term on-the-job training

Retail Salespersons
Registered Nurses
Postsecondary teachers
Customer service reps

4,256
2,394
1,628
2,063

4,992
3,096
2,153
2,534

736
702
525
471

Janitors and cleaners
Waiters and waitresses
Food preparation and
serving workers
Home health aides
Nursing aides,
orderlies, attendants
General and operations
managers

2,374
2,252
2,150

2,813
2,627
2,516

439
375
366

624
1,455

974
1,781

350 Short-term on-the-job training
326 Postsecondary vocational award

1,807

2,115

308 Bachelor’s or higher degree,
plus work experience

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, (www.bls.gov/news.release/ecopro.t06.htm)

projected job growth is in occupations requiring short-term, on-the-job training. True, many of
these jobs are part-time and do not pay family-supporting wages; but that’s an issue that requires
changes in labor market rules (i.e. higher minimum wage, easier unionization) rather than more
job training. “Any individual may benefit from education,” writes Gordon Lafer, but the bottom
line is that “most jobs do not require much in the way of sophisticated training. Fully two-thirds
of American jobs are in occupations that do not require a college degree.” 60 The same situation
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exists in metropolitan Milwaukee: according to the survey by the UWM Employment and
Training Institute, 69 percent of the available jobs in the region in May 2006 did not require a
college degree. 61
All these data suggest that the primary need in Milwaukee is not improved job training, but
rather policies that increase the demand for low- to moderate-skilled labor and attack the critical
shortage of available jobs in the region. This is not to say, of course, that workforce development
does not play an important role in Milwaukee’s labor market system; but, there is no evidence
that Milwaukee’s current array and structure of training programs is inferior to other cities or
regions or explains anything about levels of joblessness here. In the last analysis, as Timothy
Bartik argues: “The empirical evidence suggests that labor supply policies [such as job training]
are limited because they have only modest effects on helping low-income Americans increase
their employment…More targeted labor demand policies are also needed…Empirical evidence
suggests that public-service employment programs or wage subsidy programs for private
employers can be effective in increasing the employment and earnings of low-income
Americans.” 62 We shall return shortly to what such labor demand policies might look like in
Milwaukee and how they can help alleviate the crisis of black male joblessness here.
The second key element in Milwaukee’s emerging strategy to combat high rates of
minority joblessness is “minority entrepreneurship.” A host of programs to boost minority
business ownership in the region have been launched in the recent years: MBE and DBE
requirements for projects such as Miller Park, the Midwest Airlines Center, the Marquette
Interchange project, and the City Hall restoration; the Urban Entrepreneur Partnership; elements
of Midcities Venture Management and Johnson Controls’ “Metro Markets” initiatives; and the
Initiative for a Competitive Milwaukee which, although acknowledged by one of its consultants
to be essentially “dissolved,” is still touted by GMC president Julia Taylor as “an effort to start
and expand minority businesses.” 63
What is the logic behind minority entrepreneurship as a minority employment strategy?
Minority-owned firms tend to hire a higher percentage of minorities than other businesses; thus,
increasing the number and scale of minority-owned firms will presumably boost minority
employment. As former GMC executive director Robert Milbourne put it, helping minority
companies grow will “stimulate economic development among the group of businesses that is in
the best position to hire those who need employment among central-city residents.” 64
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There are many reasons to support minority entrepreneurship in Milwaukee: expanding
business opportunities, enhancing wealth creation in minority communities and diversifying the
region’s business class are chief among them. Milwaukee ranks near the bottom among U.S.
metropolitan areas in minority business ownership according to most recent studies, so there is
much to be done here. 65 But, there is strong reason to doubt the efficacy of minority
entrepreneurship as a strategy for combating black male joblessness in Milwaukee. We have
examined whether there is a correlation nationally in metropolitan areas between levels of high
black business ownership and low rates of black joblessness; for the 50 largest metropolitan
areas in the country, we found a low correlation of +.249, which translates into a very weak
positive relationship between the two variables. This lack of a strong relationship between black
business ownership and low black joblessness is illustrated in Table 30, which shows very little
variation –and certainly no linear relationship-- in black jobless rates in metro areas ranked by
their rates of black business ownership.
The reason why minority business ownership correlates poorly with low minority
joblessness in a community and why minority entrepreneurship programs are not prodigious job
creators is clear. Even in cities with a relatively high ranking in the rate of minority business
ownership, minority-owned businesses employ only a tiny fraction of overall employment. Thus,
even large increases in the number of minority-owned firms –typically small businesses with
few, if any, employees—will predictably have a tiny impact on overall employment or minority
jobless rates.

Table 30
Black Business Ownership and Black Joblessness in Metropolitan Areas
Black jobless rates in nation’s 50 largest metro areas, ranked by
rate of black business ownership
RANK IN BLACK-OWNED FIRMS PER
1,000 BLACK POPULATION (1997)
Top 10 Metropolitan Areas
Metro Areas Ranked 11-20
Metro Areas Ranked 21-30
Metro Areas Ranked 31-40
Metro Areas Ranked 41-50

AVERAGE BLACK JOBLESS RATE
(2000)
43.65%
40.07%
46.78%
44.94%
46.56%

Sources: Metropolitan areas ranking in black-owned firms per 1,000 population calculated in Marc V. Levine, Minority
Business Ownership in Metropolitan Milwaukee in the 1990s: Some Statistical Indicators and Comparisons to the Nation’s
Largest Metropolitan Areas (Milwaukee: University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee Center for Economic Development, 2001);
Jobless data from U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census 2000, Summary File 4
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Take, for example, metropolitan Atlanta, generally acknowledged to be one of the
country’s success stories in minority entrepreneurialism and a powerhouse in promoting black
business ownership. Black-owned firms account for just 1.5 percent of the Atlanta region’s
employment, and just three percent of the city of Atlanta’s private-sector jobs. There were only
9,300 employees in black-owned firms in the city of Atlanta in 2002; thus, even doubling that
total over a decade –a formidable goal—would have a relatively trivial impact on the city’s black
jobless rate. 66
Similarly, in Milwaukee, black-owned firms reported only 6,525 employees in 2002 (under
one percent of the region’s jobs), a small increase of only 205 employees from 6,320 in 1997 –
even in the face of MBE and DBE requirements on major public projects, as well as city’s
growing portfolio of minority entrepreneurship programs. 67 Although it is likely that more
concerted efforts to promote black-business ownership in Milwaukee can improve somewhat on
these job growth numbers, simple arithmetic makes it implausible that increases in black
business ownership will make more than a trivial contribution to reducing the city’s rate of black
male joblessness.
Finally, the third key element in Mayor Barrett and corporate Milwaukee’s emerging
economic development strategy is regionalism. The ill-fated Initiative for a Competitive
Milwaukee was to have been the centerpiece of a regionally-oriented inner city revitalization
program, containing ambitious plans to connect predominantly minority inner city jobless to
growth “clusters” in the regional economy. But, after four years of inaction, the ICM and its
“clusters” plan have, as we noted earlier, essentially “dissolved.”
Milwaukee’s major new regional initiative is the so-called “Milwaukee-7” (M-7), in which
the seven counties of southeastern Wisconsin 68 join together in a “Regional Economic Council”
whose job it will be “to package the many individual strengths of the seven southeastern
Wisconsin counties…and market the region as a whole.” 69 The core of the M-7 is a five-year,
$12 million marketing campaign to “brand” the region, improve its image, and sell it to
businesses shopping for new locations. So far, the M-7 has produced a fancy new web site
(“ChooseMilwaukee.com”), lots of rhetoric about regional “cooperation,” “competitiveness,”
“positioning,” and “marketing,” but precious few specifics about what regionalism could mean
for Milwaukee’s inner city jobless – beyond the boilerplate language du jour about the need for
regional workforce development to prepare for the “global economy.” Perhaps an explicit
strategy for combating the crisis of black male joblessness in Milwaukee will be part of the
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M-7’s “economic positioning strategy,” the delayed unveiling of which is now slated for spring
2007. “This unique plan” promises leaders of the initiative,” will lead to a comprehensive
identification of our regional assets and economic opportunities, layered against a backdrop of
our distinctive geographic resources and global trends.” 70 It remains unclear, however, what that
bundle of buzzwords will mean concretely for the jobless in Milwaukee’s predominantly black
inner city neighborhoods.
Mayor Barrett, in explaining the city’s support for the M-7, stated: “I need more familysupporting jobs in this community. I recognize that the city needs the suburbs and the suburbs
need the city,” and that a job gained in the region will be “everyone’s” gain. 71 This is an
astonishingly naïve view of Milwaukee’s recent economic history, and a flawed analysis of the
dynamics of regional labor markets here. As we examined earlier, all of the net job growth in
metro Milwaukee over the past two decades has been in the exurban counties. Yet, few
minorities secured any of these exurban jobs (see Table 22), and there was no discernible “trickle
down” effect of exurban job growth to the city of Milwaukee, where jobless rates for workingage black males continued to soar. Incredibly, in the face of this trend, Barrett told a meeting of
the Greater Milwaukee Committee on regional cooperation in 2005: “Our problem is not so
much that the city hasn’t grown, but that the suburbs haven’t grown enough.” (emphasis
added). 72
The new rhetoric about regional cooperation from the mayor and business leaders is
encouraging, but if the M-7 “marketing” campaign succeeds in luring employers to Walworth
county –or, for that matter, to the exurban communities of metro Milwaukee—there will be few
economic benefits for inner city residents (and black male jobless in particular). Indeed, jobless
in the entire city of Milwaukee –regardless of race or gender—will benefit from suburban growth
only if explicit policies are put into place to spread the benefits of growth throughout the region,
such as tax-base sharing and regional transit linkages. In the most recent regional jobs survey,
almost 90 percent of the entry-level job openings in metro Milwaukee were in suburban and
exurban locations; only 4 percent were located in the inner city neighborhoods where almost all
of the region’s working-age black males live. 73 Unless the mayor and other M-7 leaders put into
place regional policies to address this spatial mismatch, and embrace regional equity policies in
transportation and public finance that could truly enhance the economic prospects of the inner
city, then Milwaukee’s new era of regional cooperation will be irrelevant for the inner city’s
predominantly black jobless. However, when the mayor of Milwaukee states that the region’s big
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challenge is that “the suburbs haven’t grown enough,” that is a troubling sign of cluelessness
about the true nature of the jobs crisis in Milwaukee, a crisis that, in any event, goes beyond the
ameliorative capacity of “branding strategies” or the new regional image sought by the mayor
and the M-7 leadership. 74
In sum, the three key elements of Milwaukee’s emerging strategy to combat inner city
joblessness – workforce development, minority entrepreneurship, and M-7-style regionalism—
are seriously flawed. They are all based on a series of false assumptions regarding the job
creation process in Milwaukee and a misdiagnosis of the nature of the crisis of inner city
joblessness. Once again, this is not to deny that workforce development and minority
entrepreneurship have an important place in Milwaukee’s economic development arsenal; but, as
cornerstones of a strategy to combat black male joblessness, they have already been found
wanting. And M-7-style regionalism, even at this early stage, looks suspiciously devoid of
meaningful strategies –such as regional equity policies—that could spur inner city revitalization
and reduce joblessness.
The time has come to fundamentally rethink Milwaukee’s approach towards reducing inner
city joblessness in general (and black male joblessness in particular). Workforce development,
minority entrepreneurship, and M-7 regionalism are inadequate, and traditional economic
development policy in Milwaukee –consisting mainly of real-estate development and business
incentives—has clearly failed to produce consistent, sustained job growth. What, then, are the
alternatives?

VII. Policy Options: New Directions to Combat Black Male
Joblessness in Milwaukee
The modestly good news on black male joblessness in Milwaukee over the past two years
may offer some clues towards identifying promising policy options. As reported in Table 16,
Milwaukee’s black male jobless rate, after peaking at 51.5 percent in 2003, declined to 44.1
percent in 2005, according to the U.S. Census Bureau’s American Community Survey (ACS).
The ACS, as we’ve noted, has a rather wide margin of error, so this finding must be interpreted
with caution (see Appendix). But if the decline reflects real reduction in the rate of black male
joblessness and not just “statistical noise,” it is obviously a positive development, even if a
jobless rate of 44.1 percent remains unacceptably high.
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What factors might account for this change? Clearly, reductions in black joblessness
cannot be attributed to propitious macroeconomic trends in the city and surrounding
communities during this period: according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, between 2003-2005
the number of employed residents in the city of Milwaukee fell by 2,937, and declined by 481 in
the Milwaukee County suburbs. Any decline in black male joblessness during this period,
therefore, was not a matter of the proverbial “rising tide lifting all boats.” Milwaukee’s economy
remained stagnant.
However, one of the largest public work projects in Milwaukee’s history was launched
during this period, the $810 million Marquette Interchange project. This huge project to rebuild a
vital part of the region’s highway network not only injected a substantial, Keynesian-style
stimulus to the Milwaukee economy, but also contained explicit minority-hiring goals. As a
result, direct hiring on the project gave an important boost to minority employment in
Milwaukee: through mid-2006, according to WisDOT, 954 minority workers had been employed
on the Marquette project, 410 of whom were African American. 75
Similarly, programs such the city of Milwaukee’s “Residents Preference Program” (RPP),
mandating hiring preferences on city public works and economic development projects to
residents of targeted, low-income neighborhoods, also had a salutary effect on the labor market
for minorities (and, presumably, the black male jobless population). By the end of 2005, for
example, the $70 million City Hall restoration project reported that workers qualified by RPP
performed 20.8 percent of the project’s “total onsite construction hours,” and minorities secured
27.4 percent of the project’s work hours. 76 (The two categories overlap, of course). This means
that approximately 220 FTE construction jobs have been secured by minorities on the City Hall
restoration project, an excellent example of how public works projects, combined with
government regulations, can effectively stimulate the demand for labor, even in an otherwise
stagnant local labor market. To be sure, supply-side policies have facilitated this process: the jobreadiness, training and placement services of the BIG STEP/WRTP “Center of Excellence” have
helped prepare and place candidates for jobs in the skilled trades and industries. 77 But, the
linchpin for job growth here was not on the supply side; the catalyst was public investment,
combined with hiring regulations, which increased the demand for low- to moderate-skilled
minority-community workers. This case supports Timothy Bartik’s conclusion that “job training
and other labor supply policies also are more effective when overall labor demand is strong.” 78
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What are the policy implications of the promising impact on minority employment of the
Marquette Interchange and City Hall restoration projects? First, these examples underscore the
importance of public investment in creating jobs in a stagnant labor market. Increasing the
demand for low- and moderate-skilled workers will be essential to reducing the rate of black
male joblessness in Milwaukee. Like older U.S. cities, Milwaukee suffers from aging and, in
some cases, crumbling infrastructure, which affects not only the economic productivity of the
city and the region, but ultimately quality of life. The American Society of Civil Engineers
estimates that across the country there is a pressing need for at least $1.6 trillion in public
infrastructure investments. 79 The U.S. Conference of Mayors has made “infrastructure
investment and jobs” a top priority. 80 Major investments in renewed infrastructure in Milwaukee
–schools and roads, for example, badly in need of replacement and renovation—would not only
create immediate jobs for inner city jobless, but would also enhance the long-term economic
competitiveness and job-creation machinery of the region.
Let’s push this even a step further: a perfect example of such a jobs-producing,
competitiveness-enhancing infrastructure investment would be a regional light rail system.
Anchored in downtown Milwaukee, a rail transit system could knit the region together
economically, enhance productivity by improving commuting efficiency, make it easier for
central city jobless to access jobs in growth areas of the region, and stimulate station-area
redevelopment. Moreover, combined with muscular regionalism –not the “branding” and
“marketing” thrust of the M-7, but a serious regional planning framework—a regional rail
system could help slow down suburban sprawl, shape regional land use in economically
productive and environmentally sound ways, and help encourage private reinvestment in the
urban core.
In its political resistance to light rail, Milwaukee is increasingly isolated among U.S.
cities. “Peer” cities such as Baltimore, St. Louis, and Minneapolis have invested in rail systems
in recent years, and regions such as Denver and Portland have plans for even more extensive,
regional rail networks; in 2004, Denver approved a $4.7 billion bond issue for a twenty-year,
119-mile regional rail transit expansion. 58 percent of voters in Denver and six surrounding
counties supported the Denver “FasTracks” investment.
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In the November 2006 elections as well, voters across the country -- in conservative “Red
States” as well as more liberal “Blue States” --approved a number of local ballot measures for
rail transit. Nearly two-thirds of the voters in Salt Lake and Utah counties approved a proposition
raising the sales tax to expand the region’s light rail and commuter rail systems. In Kansas City,
voters approved financing of a $975 million, 27-mile-long light rail line. 81
Mystifyingly, Milwaukee remains outside of these trends – even in archconservative, antibig government Texas, cities such as Dallas and Houston have invested in light rail systems. Of
the 15 “Frostbelt” regions against which we have benchmarked employment trends in this study,
only Milwaukee and Detroit lack a rail transit system in operation, development, or planning. 82
The more that stubborn politicians and know-nothing talk radio hosts in Milwaukee mobilize
resistance to light rail, the more the region risks falling further behind our competitors
economically, and the more we lose the opportunity for a “big bang” investment that could
ameliorate the labor market for low- to moderate-skilled workers, and have a real impact in
reducing the rate of black male joblessness in this community. If the M-7 leadership truly wishes
to harness “regional cooperation” to both improve the economic position of the Milwaukee
region as well as expand employment opportunities for Milwaukee’s jobless, then using the M7’s political capital to promote a regional light rail system should be a top priority.
A second key policy conclusion from Milwaukee’s recent history is that targeted hiring
standards attached to local investments can improve the employment prospects for minorities and
the disadvantaged. The RPP and minority hiring goals on the Marquette project and City Hall
restoration helped generate employment for inner city jobless. Such standards should be
vigorously pursued (and monitored) on all public works projects in the region; this is a direct
way of leveraging existing public investments to meet targeted community employment needs.
But, Milwaukee should go a step further in channeling investment to enhance the
employment prospects of those most in need. Historically, one of the central weaknesses of
traditional economic development policies has been that business incentives and subsidies have
gone to private developers often with little evidence that low-income residents have benefited
from these policies. In a growing number of cities around the country, “community benefits
agreements” (CBAs) have been attached to major redevelopment projects, to give preferential
hiring to inner city residents and minorities, and to require developers receiving public subsidies
to meet job creation and wage standards. In Milwaukee, as redevelopment continues, particularly
in downtown and surrounding neighborhoods, CBAs offer a way to maximize the likelihood that
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working-age black males, as well as all workers living in disadvantaged neighborhoods, will
secure living-wage employment as a result of publicly-subsidized redevelopment projects. The
Park East corridor CBA, enacted by Milwaukee County, is one example of a local CBA, but the
city of Milwaukee should also routinely attach CBAs to agreements with individual developers
as well redevelopment zones such as the Park East corridor.
Finally, as we examined earlier in this report, a key element differentiating the situation
facing working-age black males in Milwaukee compared to other Frostbelt regions is the degree
to which racial segmentation characterizes the metropolitan labor market. In Milwaukee, only 8
percent of working-age black males lived in the suburbs in 2005, compared to an average of 49
percent in the “benchmark” Frostbelt metropolitan areas. This geographic segmentation, we
pointed out, dramatically limits employment opportunities for Milwaukee’s working-age black
males, concentrated in inner city neighborhoods, generally inaccessible to the more dynamic
labor markets of suburban and exurban communities.
Tables 31 and 32 show how jobless rates for working-age black males vary by place of
residence in a sample of metropolitan areas. In each case, the black male jobless rates are
substantially lower in the suburbs than in the city, for both the entire working-age population
(Table 31) as well as “prime working-age males,” those between 25 and 54 years old (Table 32).

Table 31:
Why opening up the Suburbs Matters: I
Jobless rates for all working-age black males (ages 16-64)
in selected metropolitan areas, 2005
by place of residence
METROPOLITAN AREA

Atlanta
Baltimore
Boston
Chicago
Cleveland
Detroit
St. Louis

JOBLESS RATE, BLACK
MALES LIVING IN
CENTRAL CITY
35.8%
39.8%
33.6%
48.3%
49.6%
48.9%
49.2%

JOBLESS RATE, BLACK
MALES LIVING IN
SUBURBS
27.0%
24.3%
24.3%
34.9%
34.9%
30.7%
35.6%

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, American Community Survey, 2005.
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Table 32:
Why opening up the Suburbs Matters: II
Jobless rates for prime working-age black males (ages 25-54)
in selected metropolitan areas, 2005
by place of residence
METROPOLITAN AREA

Atlanta
Baltimore
Boston
Chicago
Cleveland
Detroit
St. Louis

JOBLESS RATE, BLACK
MALES LIVING IN
CENTRAL CITY
25.1%
31.3%
24.9%
37.7%
41.3%
37.9%
40.1%

JOBLESS RATE, BLACK
MALES LIVING IN
SUBURBS
17.6%
13.0%
16.2%
24.7%
23.5%
20.9%
24.4%

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, American Community Survey, 2005.

The policy implications of these data seem clear: a critical element of a jobs strategy in
Milwaukee must involve opening up the suburban labor markets of the region to racial diversity.
“Opening up the suburbs” might include several policy options, but the two most important are
transportation and housing. Regional transportation policies must be realigned to facilitate the
access of central city workers to suburban employment centers; and building affordable housing
in the suburbs is essential, so that low- to –moderate-skilled workers, with limited incomes, can
live in greater proximity to the location of 90 percent of the region’s entry-level job openings.
David Rusk, for example, has detailed how in affluent Montgomery County, Maryland –a suburb
of Washington, D.C. – “aggressive mixed-income housing policies” have diversified the county
and reduced economic segregation. 83 If the M-7 leadership is serious about cultivating “regional
cooperation,” then developing regional transportation and affordable housing strategies would be
an excellent point of departure.
In conclusion, three approaches to regional job creation –investment in public
infrastructure, community benefits agreements, and opening up the suburbs—offer promise for
alleviating the crisis of black male joblessness in Milwaukee. These strategies are not panaceas
for the crisis, and clearly they are not politically expedient policies: there is ferocious political
opposition in Milwaukee, for example, to light rail, community benefits agreements, and
affordable housing in the suburbs. The current array of metro Milwaukee policies –training,
entrepreneurship, and regional “branding”—may be politically more feasible, but, as we have
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seen, are unlikely to make a dent in Milwaukee’s jobs crisis. As Gordon Lafer points out in The
Job Training Charade: “Training is popular not because it meets a critical need of any
constituency, but because it makes minimal demands on those in power and has little effect in
reshaping the labor market.” 84 Milwaukee desperately needs “demand-side” policies that reshape
the regional labor market, if we are to seriously tackle the problem of black male joblessness
here. This is the time for bold action, not political expediency.
The crisis of black male joblessness is complicated, and this study—focused on certain
structural economic factors-- covers but a part of the issue. In the long run, human capital –
education—is critical to improving Milwaukee’s labor market. As we saw in Tables 23-27, the
schooling deficit among Milwaukee’s working-age black males is generally worse than for black
males in other cities, racial gaps in education in Milwaukee and across the country are enormous,
and “reconnecting disadvantaged young men” to quality school systems remains a Sisyphusean
challenge for policymakers. 85 In addition, recent studies in Baltimore and Chicago have
documented the degree to which finding work is increasingly problematic for young black males
in an era of mass incarceration. 86 In Baltimore, 52 percent of African American males between
the ages of 20 and 30 are “under the control of the criminal justice system”: in jail or prison, or
on probation or parole. 87 Milwaukee’s situation is comparable: according to recently released
report by John Pawasarat at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, an estimated 40 percent of
African American males ages 25 through 29 currently living in Milwaukee County have spent
time in the Wisconsin corrections system; 42 percent of 30-34 year olds have likewise been
incarcerated. 88 At a minimum, such social realities constitute important “barriers to
employment” and complicate the potential impact of the labor market strategies we have
explored here.
But, notwithstanding the complexities of improving urban education or grappling with the
sociology of inner city life, generating aggregate job growth is a sine qua non for alleviating the
crisis of black male joblessness. The policy options we have outlined are just a starting point and
certainly are not a panacea. But increasing the demand for low- and moderate-skilled labor in
Milwaukee can reduce black male joblessness and at least bring Milwaukee’s rates more in line
with other Frostbelt cities (although, of course, rates elsewhere remain too high as well). As we
have seen, current policies are unlikely to seriously attack the city’s alarmingly high inner city
jobless rate, and it is time to rethink local strategy. We can do better.
62

UWM Center for Economic Development

63

UWM Center for Economic Development

APPENDIX
Note on Data
This study uses a variety of data sources from the U.S. Bureau of the Census: the decennial
census, the economic census, and county business patterns; as well as data on employment from
the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.
For the most recent data on race and employment in cities and metropolitan areas, we have
used the American Community Survey (ACS). A new annual nationwide survey conducted by the
U.S. Bureau of the Census since 2001, the ACS is meant to provide annual information on
various social, economic, and demographic characteristics of the population ordinarily available
every ten years in the decennial census “long form.”
However, nationally, the 2005 ACS surveyed about 3 million households, compared to 17
million in the Census 2000 long form; thus, statistically, the ACS data contain larger sampling
error than the census long form. The ACS reports this sampling error as “margin of error”
alongside estimated values for specific variables.
ACS samples for urban areas, especially when broken down by race and ethnicity, are
small enough in some cases to contain rather substantial error margins. For example, the 2005
ACS estimate for the black male jobless rate in metropolitan Milwaukee was 43.1 percent;
however, taking into account the margin of error indicated by ACS, the statistical range of
possible values for this variable was from 32.6 percent to 53.6 percent. Although this error
margin is substantial, it is no greater than the statistical range contained in the local data
historically provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (and routinely used by researchers and
policymakers) on race, ethnicity, and unemployment in its report, The Geographical Profile of
Employment and Unemployment. For example, in 2002, the most recent BLS report on race and
unemployment estimated a black male unemployment rate (note: not jobless rate) in Milwaukee
of 19.7 percent, with an “error range of rate” of 12.9 to 26.5 percent.
It goes with the territory of small samples on local employment data that there will be a
substantial error range, particularly when the sample is broken down into even smaller
components by race, ethnicity, and sex. This means, as we note in the study, that care must be
exercised in interpreting changes in jobless rates from one year to the next or differences
between cities or metro areas, all of which might merely reflect measurement “noise.” For
64
UWM Center for Economic Development

example, in Tables 16 and 17 in this study, there was a substantial annual variation in the rate of
Hispanic male joblessness reported by the ACS in Milwaukee between 2002-2004; these
inexplicable fluctuations almost surely reflect measurement noise and not genuine shifts in the
Hispanic jobless rate.
Similarly, in comparing trends in black male jobless trends between 2002-2005 in our pool
of “benchmark” cities and regions, there are a few anomalies in the ACS data. For example,
between 2002-2005, there was a huge surge in the rate of black male joblessness in Cleveland
and Pittsburgh; both cities rose from the middle of the rankings of Frostbelt cities to having the
highest rates of black male joblessness. Yet, as the table below illustrates, the number of
working-age black males fluctuates annually in both cities far too much to be credible. It simply
is not plausible that the working-age black male population fell in Cleveland by 20.8% (13,106
men) between 2002-2003, rose the very next year by 34.1% (17,066 men), and then fell again by
12.0% (8,065 men) between 2004-2005. But, that is what the ACS reports. Clearly, the outer
limits of sampling error were reached in these cases; but these examples are a warning to draw
guarded conclusions on short-term shifts that show up in ACS data. (For the record, the
fluctuations in measures of the working-age black male population in Milwaukee in the ACS
data were much less volatile than in these cities).

Number of Working-Age Black Males in
Cleveland and Pittsburgh, 2002-2005,
According to American Community Survey

CITY

2002

2003

2004

2005

Cleveland

63,092

49,986

67,052

58,987

Pittsburgh

17,178

17,358

23,113

21,796

With anomalies such as these, as we note in the study, context and longer time series are
important in sorting out genuine trends as opposed to measurement variation; that is precisely
what we have provided with the extensive historical data on male joblessness in Milwaukee in
part V of this report.
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Notwithstanding these caveats, the ACS provides the most up-to-date statistics on race and
employment in U.S. cities and metropolitan areas and, used cautiously, can give us some sense
of the most recent trends.
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